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A Network Theory of Patentability 
Laura G. Pedraza-Fariña† & Ryan Whalen†† 
Patent law is built upon a fundamental premise: only significant inventions 
receive patent protection while minor improvements remain in the public domain. 
This premise is indispensable for maintaining an optimal balance between incen-
tivizing new innovation and providing public access to existing innovation. Despite 
its importance, the doctrine that performs this gatekeeping role—nonobviousness—
has long remained indeterminate and vague. Judicial opinions have struggled to 
articulate both what makes an invention significant (or nonobvious) and how to 
measure nonobviousness in specific cases. These difficulties are due in large part to 
the existence of two clashing theoretical frameworks, cognitive and economic, that 
have vied for prominence in justifying nonobviousness. Neither framework, however, 
has generated doctrinal tests that can be easily and consistently applied. 
This Article draws on a novel approach—network theory—to answer both the 
conceptual question (what is a nonobvious invention?) and the measurement ques-
tion (how do we determine nonobviousness in specific cases?). First, it shows that 
what is missing in current conceptual definitions of nonobviousness is an underly-
ing theory of innovation. It then supplies this missing piece. Building upon insights 
from network science, we model innovation as a process of search and recombination 
of existing knowledge. Distant searches that combine disparate or weakly connected 
portions of social and information networks tend to produce high-impact, new ideas 
that open novel innovation trajectories. Distant searches also tend to be costly and 
risky. In contrast, local searches tend to result in incremental innovation that is 
more routine, less costly, and less risky. From a network theory perspective, then, the 
goal of nonobviousness should be to reward, and therefore to incentivize, those risky 
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distant searches and recombinations that produce the most socially significant in-
novations. By emphasizing factors specific to the structure of innovation—namely, 
the risks and costs of the search and recombination process—a network approach 
complements and deepens current economic understandings of nonobviousness.  
Second, based on our network theory of innovation, we develop an empirical, algo-
rithmic measure of patentability—what we term a patent’s “network nonobviousness 
score” (NNOS). We harness data from US patent records to calculate the distance 
between the technical knowledge areas recombined in any given invention (or pa-
tent), allowing us to assign each patent a specific NNOS. We propose a doctrinal 
framework that incorporates an invention’s NNOS to nonobviousness determina-
tions both at the examination phase and during patent litigation. 
Our use of network science to develop a legal algorithm is a methodological 
innovation in law, with implications for broader debates about computational law. 
We illustrate how differences in algorithm design can lead to different nonobvious-
ness outcomes, and discuss how to mitigate the negative impact of black box  
algorithms. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the United States, and in every single patent system in the 
world, one patentability doctrine—the nonobviousness doctrine—
stands as the cornerstone of the patent bargain.1 This bargain en-
sures that the government only grants the monopoly associated 
with a patent when the inventor has created something suffi-
ciently different from what came before.2 By ensuring that only 
significant technological improvements obtain patent protection, 
the nonobviousness doctrine both incentivizes socially significant 
innovation, and keeps minor technological advances that don’t re-
quire patent incentives in the public domain.3 Without the nonob-
viousness requirement, patent rights would proliferate until in-
creased licensing fees, litigation expenses, and transaction costs 
would impede, rather than foster, innovation.4 
 
 1 See John F. Duffy, Inventing Invention: A Case Study of Legal Innovation, 86 Tex 
L Rev 1, 6 (2007): 
[W]orld patent law has now reached a consensus that the type of invention re-
quired for patentability must include some step that is not technically trivial, 
where triviality is measured by the capabilities of a person skilled in the relevant 
technical field. This general requirement, which will be referred to here as non-
obviousness, is now recognized throughout the world as the essence of invention. 
See also Robert M. Hunt, Patentability, Industry Structure, and Innovation, 52 J Indust 
Econ 401, 402 (2004) (“When we speak of a standard of patentability in this paper, we 
focus on American patent law’s requirement of nonobviousness, or what is called the  
inventive step in Europe.”); Robert Patrick Merges and John Fitzgerald Duffy, Patent Law 
and Policy 513 (Carolina Academic 7th ed 2017) (“[N]onobviousness is the ‘final gatekeeper 
of the patent system.’”). 
 2 See, for example, Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co v Supermarket Equipment 
Corp, 340 US 147, 152–53 (1950) (“A patent for a combination which only unites old ele-
ments with no change in their respective functions . . . obviously withdraws what already 
is known into the field of its monopoly and diminishes the resources available to skillful 
men.”); KSR International Co v Teleflex Inc, 550 US 398, 427 (2007) (“[A]s progress begin-
ning from higher levels of achievement is expected in the normal course, the results of 
ordinary innovation are not the subject of exclusive rights under the patent laws. . . . These 
premises led to the bar on patents claiming obvious subject matter established in  
Hotchkiss and codified in § 103.”). 
 3 See KSR, 550 US at 427 (“[T]he results of ordinary innovation are not the subject 
of exclusive rights under the patent laws. Were it otherwise patents might stifle, rather 
than promote, the progress of useful arts.”); Bonito Boats, Inc v Thunder Craft Boats, Inc, 
489 US 141, 146 (1989) (“[A] careful balance between the need to promote innovation and 
the recognition that imitation and refinement through imitation are both necessary to in-
vention itself and the very lifeblood of a competitive economy.”). 
 4 See Michael Abramowicz and John F. Duffy, The Inducement Standard of Patent-
ability, 120 Yale L J 1590, 1594 (2011). 
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Despite its centrality to patent law, nonobviousness has long 
been considered a particularly vague and unpredictable doctrine. 
Roughly a century after the Supreme Court first articulated the 
doctrine in Hotchkiss v Greenwood,5 Judge Learned Hand fa-
mously lamented that nonobviousness was “as fugitive, impalpa-
ble, wayward, and vague a phantom as exists in the whole para-
phernalia of legal concepts.”6 Today, the nonobviousness doctrine 
remains as vague a phantom as it was then. Judicial opinions 
have continued to struggle to articulate both what makes an in-
vention significant (or nonobvious) and how to measure nonobvi-
ousness in specific cases.7 
In this Article, we draw on a novel approach—network the-
ory—to answer both the conceptual question (what is a nonobvi-
ous invention?) and the measurement question (how do we deter-
mine nonobviousness in specific cases?). We identify—and 
supply—a crucial missing piece in competing economic and psy-
chological conceptualizations of patentability: an underlying the-
ory of innovation. Building upon insights from network science, 
we model innovation as a process of search across knowledge net-
works and recombination of the knowledge obtained from this 
search process.8 As we elaborate more fully below, from a network 
theory perspective, the answer to the conceptual question is that 
nonobviousness should seek to incentivize those risky and costly 
distant searches and recombinations across knowledge networks 
that produce the most socially significant innovations.9 By em-
phasizing factors specific to the structure of innovation that law 
and economic analyses overlook—namely, the risks and costs of 
 
 5 52 US 248 (1851). The Supreme Court in Hotchkiss announced a third requirement 
for patentability in addition to the then-codified statutory requirements of novelty and 
utility. Id at 248, 267. 
 6 Harries v Air King Products Co, 183 F2d 158, 162 (2d Cir 1950). See also Gregory 
N. Mandel, Another Missed Opportunity: The Supreme Court’s Failure to Define 
Nonobviousness or Combat Hindsight Bias in KSR v. Teleflex, 12 Lewis & Clark L Rev 
323, 324 (2008) (arguing, following the Court’s opinion in KSR, that an exclusive focus on 
“the factual underpinnings that help inform non-obvious analysis . . . has blinded many 
from the lapse that the quantum of ingenuity necessary to satisfy the non-obvious 
requirement has never been elaborated,” and predicting that “[t]he failure to instruct on 
the legal question of nonobviousness means that non-obvious decisions will remain 
inconsistent and unpredictable”); Tun-Jen Chiang, A Cost-Benefit Approach to Patent Ob-
viousness, 82 St John’s L Rev 39, 54 (2008) (calling the nonobviousness doctrine a 
“plaything of the judiciary [that] mean[s] anything the judges cho[o]se to make it mean”), 
quoting Giles S. Rich, Why and How Section 103 Came to Be, 14 Fed Cir Bar J 181,  
186 (2004). 
 7 See Part I.A. 
 8 See Part II.A. 
 9 See Parts II.B, II.C, and III. 
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the search and recombination process—a network approach nu-
ances current economic understandings of nonobviousness.10 Cru-
cially, our network theory of innovation grounds the development 
of an empirical network measure of nonobviousness—the “net-
work nonobviousness score” (NNOS).11 Because a network meas-
ure can provide a snapshot of the connections between technolog-
ical areas at any given point in time, it simultaneously addresses 
two competing concerns in measuring nonobviousness: the need 
to correct for hindsight bias (which makes most inventions seem 
obvious after the fact) while accounting for forces that drive inno-
vation without patent protection.12 Methodologically, this Article 
is the first to our knowledge to use network science to develop an 
algorithmic approach to legal decision-making. As is the case for 
any algorithm designed to guide legal decision-making, our meas-
ure raises questions about algorithmic bias. We take these con-
cerns as an opportunity to further explore and illustrate how al-
gorithmic design can influence doctrinal outcomes, and to engage 
with debates about algorithmic justice.13 
At the root of nonobviousness’s conceptual vagueness lies a 
series of judicial decisions stretching back to Hotchkiss that im-
plicitly blend two theoretical approaches to conceptualizing non-
obviousness—approaches that can lead to different prescriptive 
outcomes.14 The first approach, an economic one, conceptualizes 
nonobviousness as a policy lever to weed out those inventions that 
do not require the inducement of a patent because other incen-
tives, such as market forces, provide sufficient motivation to in-
novate. This economic view emerged as early as 1883, when the 
Supreme Court in Atlantic Works v Brady15 emphasized that a 
patent is unnecessary, and an invention is therefore obvious, 
when “[t]he process of development in manufactures creates a 
constant demand for new appliances, which the skill of ordinary 
head-workmen and engineers is generally adequate to devise, and 
which, indeed, are the natural and proper outgrowth of such  
development.”16 
Yet another perspective, a cognitive one, developed alongside 
this economic view and continues to influence nonobviousness de-
cisions. Under a cognitive approach, the nonobviousness doctrine 
 
 10 See Part I.B. 
 11 See Part III. 
 12 See Part II.D. 
 13 See Part III.F and Conclusion. 
 14 See Part I.A. 
 15 107 US 192 (1883). 
 16 Id at 199. 
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seeks to reward creative inventions that are outside the cognitive 
grasp of an “ordinary artisan.”17 This cognitive view is also pre-
sent in the doctrine’s earliest opinions, including Atlantic Works, 
in which the Court defined a nonobvious technical advance as one 
that evinced “the exercise of invention somewhat above ordinary 
mechanical or engineering skill.”18 Although more recent deci-
sions tend to emphasize an economic perspective,19 these two the-
oretical approaches continue to coexist. Indeed, the Supreme 
Court’s most recent nonobviousness decision, KSR International 
Co v Teleflex Inc,20 perpetuates this blended approach, implying 
that cognitive and economic rationales are one and the same.21 
Yet there are key underlying normative differences between these 
two approaches. Some creative inventions may not need the eco-
nomic inducement of a patent. Conversely, some uncreative but 
time- and labor-intensive inventions may not come to be absent 
such patent inducement.22 
How we conceptualize nonobviousness has clear implications 
for how we measure it: Should nonobviousness rely on ascertain-
ing how creative a particular invention is? Or should it instead 
focus on mapping the strength of market forces to determine 
whether it would have been achieved regardless of patent incen-
tives? Measuring nonobviousness poses an additional challenge: 
that of guarding against hindsight bias while simultaneously giv-
ing enough weight to contextual factors that propel innovation.23 
More specifically, whether through a cognitive or economic lens, 
ascertaining nonobviousness requires fact finders to “travel back 
 
 17 The ordinary artisan, or “person having ordinary skill in the art” (PHOSITA), is a 
construct in patent law, similar to the “reasonable person” in tort law that represents the 
“average” inventor. See for example Jonathan J. Darrow, The Neglected Dimension of Pa-
tent Law’s PHOSITA Standard, 23 Harv J L & Tech 227, 235 n 38 (2009). In Part III.E.2, 
we discuss how a network perspective provides a theoretical foundation for defining the 
background technical knowledge of a PHOSITA in a way that captures how that 
knowledge evolves over time—a task that patent law doctrine is currently ill-equipped to 
perform. A network perspective that views technological fields as evolving over time also 
raises important questions about how to define a PHOSITA’s “primary field” of work—
questions that are underresearched and undertheorized in patent law. 
 18 Atlantic Works, 107 US at 200. 
 19 See Part I.A. 
 20 550 US 398 (2007). 
 21 See Part I.A. 
 22 See Part II.B.2. 
 23 “Hindsight bias” refers to people’s subjective and unconscious tendency to incor-
rectly assign a high predictability to a past event based on their present knowledge that 
the event has, in fact, occurred. In other words, in hindsight, most inventions are likely to 
seem obvious. See Mandel, 12 Lewis & Clark L Rev at 336–37 (cited in note 6). 
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in time” to the moment of invention24 and, from this temporal van-
tage point, determine whether the invention “would have been 
obvious . . . to a person having ordinary skill in the art.”25 This 
exercise—the reconstruction of the incentives and hurdles facing 
the inventor, and the mapping of the relevant universe of 
knowledge available to the inventor—entails a high risk of hind-
sight bias on the part of the fact finder, who has prior knowledge 
of the completed invention and the steps taken to create it. In 
short, most inventions will appear obvious in hindsight.26 
These two ways of conceptualizing nonobviousness that 
emerged in doctrinal cases have their counterparts in the aca-
demic literature, reflected in two strands of theoretical writings: 
one emphasizing how to use insights from economics to define 
nonobviousness, the other emphasizing how to integrate psycho-
logical research on creativity to the nonobviousness inquiry.27 Un-
der a law and economics view, patents should be granted only in 
cases of market failure—that is, when market forces alone are in-
sufficient to bring about the invention. The goal of nonobvious-
ness, then, is to identify those inventions that would not arise, or 
would be significantly delayed, but for the patent grant. Economic 
models of nonobviousness link such market failures to the uncer-
tainty surrounding the outcome of a particular research path,  
as well as the costs of resolving such uncertainty.28 Therefore,  
 
 24 Depending on whether the invention falls under the 1952 Patent Act, 66 Stat 792, 
codified as amended in various sections of Title 35, or the Leahy-Smith America Invents 
Act (AIA), Pub L No 112-29, 125 Stat 284 (2011), codified in various sections of Title 35, 
the relevant time for assessing nonobviousness is “the time the invention was made” (un-
der the 1952 Act), or the “filing date” (under the AIA). 
 25 35 USC § 103. 
 26 See, for example, Gregory N. Mandel, Patently Non-Obvious: Empirical Demonstra-
tion that the Hindsight Bias Renders Patent Decisions Irrational, 67 Ohio St L J 1391, 1411–
14 (2006) (finding that “[e]x post knowledge of invention deeply affected participants’ con-
clusions regarding whether an invention was non-obvious ex ante”); Gregory N. Mandel, 
Patently Non-Obvious II: Experimental Study on the Hindsight Issue Before the Supreme 
Court in KSR v. Teleflex, 9 Yale J L & Tech 1, 18–20 (2006–2007) (“Participants who were 
not informed of the invention were substantially more likely to judge a solution non-obvi-
ous than participants who were informed what the invention was. This result held across 
both scenarios—whether there was a suggestion to combine prior art references  
or not.”). 
 27 See Part I.B. 
 28 See, for example, Robert P. Merges, Uncertainty and the Standard of Patentability, 
7 High Tech L J 1, 47–55 (1992) (discussing how the nonobviousness standard could be 
used to incentivize uncertain and costly research); Glynn S. Lunney Jr, E-Obviousness, 7 
Mich Telecomm & Tech L Rev 363, 412–13 (2001) (arguing that the nonobviousness re-
quirement can encourage individuals to invent uses that are most valuable to society by 
awarding patents only to inventions that were costly to create); Richard A. Posner and 
William M. Landes, The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property Law 304–05 (Harvard 
2003) (“To the extent that the requirement of nonobviousness succeeds in preventing the 
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uncertain and costly research typically requires the economic in-
ducement of a patent to be produced at a socially optimal level.29 
Proponents of a psychological (or cognitive) perspective view the 
core of patent law as concerned with providing inventors incen-
tives to act creatively.30 Psychological theories of nonobviousness 
lead to a cognitive doctrinal framework aimed at identifying and 
rewarding creative inventions while avoiding hindsight bias that 
prevents observers from appreciating such creativity ex post.31 
Both economic and psychological perspectives are limited in 
their ability to generate doctrinal prescriptions that can be easily 
applied by both the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) and 
courts.32 Many of the contextual economic factors needed to assess 
the economic nonobviousness of an invention are quite hard, if not 
 
patenting of inventions that would not cost a lot to discover and perfect, it limits patent 
races, which are more costly the greater the net expected gain from winning.”); Michael J. 
Meurer and Katherine J. Strandburg, Patent Carrots and Sticks: A Model of Nonobvious-
ness, 12 Lewis & Clark L Rev 547, 570–74 (2008) (claiming that the nonobviousness stand-
ard should be a question of law so as to better incentivize inventors to pursue a more 
difficult research path with socially optimal rewards); Chiang, 82 St John’s L Rev at 72–
76 (cited in note 6) (arguing that a cost-benefit approach to obviousness would better ac-
celerate innovation); Abramowicz and Duffy, 120 Yale L J at 1597 (cited in note 4) (advo-
cating that “[u]nder a rigorously enforced inducement standard, patents would cover only 
those innovations that otherwise would not be created or disclosed”). See also Part I.B. 
 29 See, for example, Merges, 7 High Tech L J at 47–55 (cited in note 28); Lunney, 7 
Mich Telecomm & Tech L Rev at 412–13 (cited in note 28); Meurer and Strandburg, 12 
Lewis & Clark L Rev at 570–74 (cited in note 28); Chiang, 82 St John’s L Rev at 72–76 
(cited in note 6). 
 30 See, for example, Jeanne C. Fromer, A Psychology of Intellectual Property, 104 Nw 
U L Rev 1441, 1487 (2010) (arguing that the nonobviousness requirement emphasizes the 
value of creativity because “solutions that can be derived with at best a minimally creative 
process—possibly even absent certain steps, such as incubation—are not valuable”); 
Christopher Buccafusco, et al, Experimental Tests of Intellectual Property Laws’ Creativity 
Thresholds, 92 Tex L Rev 1921, 1923–26 (2014) (evaluating whether different patentabil-
ity thresholds would incentivize more creativity); R. Keith Sawyer, Creativity, Innovation, 
and Obviousness, 12 Lewis & Clark L Rev 461, 481–85 (2008) (describing the research into 
hindsight bias and other forms of implicit bias that could guide courts in evaluating the 
obviousness of an invention); Colleen M. Seifert, Now Why Didn’t I Think of That? The 
Cognitive Processes That Create the Obvious, 12 Lewis & Clark L Rev 489, 494–507 (2008) 
(presenting the results of studies on problem-solving and creativity to conclude that un-
derstanding the nonobviousness of ideas requires a more extensive theory of human cog-
nitive processes than the Supreme Court adopted in KSR); Steven M. Smith, Invisible 
Assumptions and the Unintentional Use of Knowledge and Experiences in Creative Cogni-
tion, 12 Lewis & Clark L Rev 509, 516–23, 523–25 (2008) (analyzing research on innova-
tion and the creative process to suggest a guide for nonobviousness in patent law); Janet 
Davidson and Nicole Greenberg, Psychologists’ Views on Nonobviousness: Are They Obvi-
ous?, 12 Lewis & Clark L Rev 527, 540–43 (2008) (suggesting that patent lawyers and 
cognitive psychologists form a collaborative web to help resolve patent issues surrounding 
nonobviousness). 
 31 See Part I.B. 
 32 Id. 
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impossible, for the PTO to evaluate.33 For instance, assessing 
surges of market demand for a particular invention that would 
suggest the invention is obvious is outside the expertise of patent 
examiners. The same is true of assessing whether an exogenous 
technological advance took place around the date of invention. 
Such an assessment requires the type of meta-analysis of innova-
tion trends that neither the PTO nor the courts are equipped to 
carry out. For their part, psychological theorists have also strug-
gled to translate their conceptual insights into easily applicable 
doctrinal frameworks. First, although psychological theory em-
phasizes the pervasiveness of hindsight bias, it provides no clear 
way to debias observers. To the contrary, most experiments on 
hindsight bias show it to be persistent and resistant to debiasing 
interventions.34 Second, creativity exists on a continuum,35 and 
psychological theories cannot answer the important question of 
where to draw the line between obvious and nonobvious inven-
tions or even how to measure where an invention might be on that 
creativity continuum. 
This Article makes three key contributions: First, to theoret-
ical debates surrounding how to conceptualize nonobviousness. 
Second, to doctrinal debates surrounding how to best measure 
nonobviousness. Finally, to broader concerns in the legal academy 
about the use and misuse of legal algorithms. At the theoretical 
level, we draw upon a rich body of literature that approaches in-
novation from a network perspective. By modeling innovation as 
the result of recombinant search across information and social 
networks—that is, as the product of seeking out information and 
recombining it in new ways—networked innovation research has 
both enriched our understanding of how significant innovation  
occurs, as well as our ability to predict and measure it. From a 
 
 33 The Court in Graham v John Deere Co of Kansas City, 383 US 1 (1966), made clear 
that “the primary responsibility for sifting out unpatentable material lies in the Patent 
Office,” thus highlighting the importance of developing a nonobviousness test that can be 
applied both by the PTO and the courts. Id at 18. 
 34 See, for example, Mandel, 67 Ohio St L J at 1400–03 (cited in note 26) (collecting 
sources that explain how “[t]he hindsight bias has proven remarkably unyielding to varied 
efforts to ameliorate its impact”); Davidson and Greenberg, 12 Lewis & Clark L Rev at 539 
(cited in note 30) (“Hindsight bias is poisonous for the nonobviousness requirement in pa-
tent law. Even though the Supreme Court thinks it sufficient for patent examiners and 
courts simply to be aware of, and cautious about, hindsight bias, research presents a com-
pelling case that this bias is impervious to change.”). 
 35 See, for example, Davidson and Greenberg, 12 Lewis & Clark L Rev at 541–42 
(cited in note 30) (challenging the contention that an invention is obvious if someone of 
average skill in the arts could identify the invention via normal processes because “psy-
chological models of creativity propose that individuals use the same mental processes for 
both routine and non-routine problem solving”). 
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network perspective, particular innovations can be understood as 
the product of two different types of search and recombination 
strategies—often characterized as “global” or “local” searches. 
These two types of searches reveal two different underlying inno-
vation structures that provide strong signals about how risky and 
costly a particular innovation is, as well as how likely it is to pro-
vide a large social benefit. All else being equal, global searches 
and recombinations are costlier, riskier, and more socially signif-
icant—and therefore less economically obvious—than their local 
counterparts. To succeed, global searches and recombinations 
typically require the bridging of large cognitive distances between 
two or more technological communities. This type of bridging en-
tails the costly assembly of teams with multiple kinds of expertise 
and the development of tools to bridge those large cognitive dis-
tances between technological domains. In contrast, research in-
volving local search and recombination is likely to involve well-
trodden technical areas in which routines and tools for answering 
typical domain questions have evolved.36 Because all else is al-
most never equal, however, we also analyze situations when 
global searches may nevertheless result in an economically obvi-
ous invention (for example, when the technological distances we 
employ in our empirical measure do not correspond well with cog-
nitive distances), and when local searches may nonetheless re-
quire the inducement of a patent (such as those in which preex-
isting knowledge elements provide only a starting point for 
intensive and costly research). 
Our theoretical analysis of the nonobviousness requirement 
leads to several important refinements to the predominant eco-
nomic view, which we largely adopt as the best reading of the pa-
tent statute. First, we note that the market forces emphasized by 
economic views (demand surges and exogenous technological de-
velopments) fail to capture important structural determinants to 
innovation.37 Our theory pinpoints innovation-specific factors—
the technological and cognitive distance between the knowledge 
domains recombined in a given invention—that deeply influence 
the invention’s economic risk and cost, and therefore its economic 
nonobviousness.38 Second, we show how some psychological 
 
 36 See Parts II.A–B. 
 37 For an in-depth analysis of the structural and social barriers leading to innovation 
failures, see generally Laura G. Pedraza-Fariña, The Social Origins of Innovation Fail-
ures, 70 SMU L Rev 377 (2017). 
 38 See Part II.B. 
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measures of creativity—those that see increased creativity as re-
sulting from the combination of cognitively distant knowledge do-
mains—are directly correlated with market failures. A network 
perspective thus provides a way to reinterpret seemingly irrecon-
cilable judicial opinions that blend psychological and economic 
perspectives by reframing some psychological measures of crea-
tivity as proxies for economic nonobviousness.39 
Moving from theory to doctrine, network science allows us to 
develop an objective network measure of nonobviousness that rec-
ognizes the dynamic nature of innovation. Through our algorith-
mic network nonobviousness score (NNOS), our network ap-
proach can quantify an important feature that helps distinguish 
obvious from nonobvious inventions: the technological distance 
that an invention traverses in the process of recombining 
knowledge inputs. To develop our NNOS, we harness the vast yet 
largely untapped trove of data from patent records dating back to 
1836. This data contains the classification records according to 
technology class for every patent granted since 1836,40 a total of 
over thirty-nine million classification events. We use these classi-
fication records to assemble a network representation of the dif-
ferent areas of technical knowledge used in inventions. This net-
work can then help show the structure of the knowledge 
recombinations that underlie any given patent. 
An example is helpful to illustrate how we calculate an in-
vention’s NNOS. Let’s begin with a likely familiar invention: the 
development of a machine-learning thermostat (a thermostat that 
is able to learn over time to maintain energy efficiency).41 The 
PTO assigned this invention to the following three technological 
categories: (1) Air conditioning/ventilation systems; (2) Systems 
for controlling nonelectric variables; and (3) Transmission of dig-
ital information. To calculate the NNOS for this invention, first, 
we calculate the pairwise probability (between each combination 
 
 39 See Part II.C. 
 40 1836 is the earliest year for which we have reliable patent data because a fire at 
the patent office destroyed earlier patenting records. See Alan C. Marco, et al, The USPTO 
Historical Patent Data Files: Two Centuries of Invention *12 (unpublished USPTO  
Economic Working Paper No 2015-1, June 2015), archived at https://perma.cc/6BRZ 
-Y72R. The data used in our analyses below draws on all of this patenting data for all 
utility patents granted up to the end of 2016. See Part III.B. 
 41 The patent relating to this example is Yoky Matsuoka, et al, HVAC schedule  
establishment in an intelligent, network-connected thermostat, US Patent No 9,256,230 
(filed Feb 27, 2014), archived at https://perma.cc/7JHQ-DL85. For a more comprehensive 
explanation of the NNOS calculation, with specific reference to this particular invention, 
see Part III.C. 
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of two categories) that such combination appeared in all inven-
tions that came before the invention at issue. In other words, we 
ask the question: In the universe of all prior inventions before the 
date of the present invention, how frequently did a patent show a 
combination of technologies (1) and (2); (1) and (3); and (2) and 
(3)? Second, we choose the pair of technology areas that represent 
the longest knowledge distance between any two technology areas 
(and therefore the lowest recombination probability). We take 
this recombination probability as an invention’s NNOS—in other 
words, the recombination probability of the most distant pair of 
technology classes, representing the biggest recombination leap 
contained in the invention. In this particular example, drawn from 
a real-life patent, the recombination probability between (1) and 
(2) is 0.03690. The recombination probability between (1) and (3) is 
0.01116. And the recombination probability between (2) and (3) is 
0.00666.42 Therefore, the NNOS for this invention is 0.00666. 
These probabilities also tell a story about the technological 
trajectory of this invention. The fact that technology areas (1) and 
(2) display the highest recombination frequency of all three com-
binations tells us that, at the time of the invention, inventions 
that brought together air conditioning/ventilation technology and 
systems for coordinating nonelectrical variables were relatively 
commonplace. That these two occur together relatively often is 
unsurprising, as temperature is one potential nonelectric varia-
ble. In contrast, inventions that combined technology area (3) 
(transmission of digital information) with either technology areas 
(1) or (2) were relatively rare. This indicates that, at the time of 
the invention, very few inventions combined the digital transmis-
sion of information with mechanical air conditioning/ventilation 
systems and systems of controlling nonelectric variables. The 
least frequent combination—between systems for controlling non-
electric variables and transmission of digital information—indi-
cates that the invention at issue was a pioneer in developing ther-
mostats that are capable of being programmed and modified 
remotely through digital signals. In turn, this suggests that the 
 
 42 Note that for each pair there are two recombination frequencies: for example, the 
frequency with which a patent containing category (1) also contains category (2), and the 
frequency with which a patent containing category (2) also contains category (1). We 
choose the highest frequency between any given pair as the representative frequency for 
the purpose of NNOS calculation, choosing the technological community with the highest 
likelihood of making a particular recombination leap as our reference community. See 
Part III.C. 
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thermostat’s development was the result of global search and re-
combination processes, and thus required the economically risky 
recombination of cognitively distant knowledge.43 
Because the distance between technology classes and the 
background knowledge of inventors changes over time, our meas-
ure allows us to “travel back in time” to identify combinations that 
were atypical when first created, but may now have become com-
monplace, as is the case with the thermostat example above—
thus avoiding hindsight bias.44 Although network nonobviousness 
scores, like creativity, also exist on a continuum, we can measure 
where a particular invention falls within that continuum—allow-
ing for more precise comparisons between inventions. 
To illustrate how our empirical network nonobviousness 
measure can help guide decision-making, we apply it to litigated 
cases.45 Our measure identifies several cases that have been in-
correctly decided under a network theory of patentability, while 
also providing empirical support for many other Federal Circuit 
nonobviousness decisions.46 We propose a doctrinal framework 
that incorporates the NNOS as an initial threshold test to sort 
patents into local and global types and to guide further analysis 
based on the different innovation dynamics underlying these two 
innovation types.47 
Finally, our Article is the first to our knowledge to employ a 
network methodology to design a prescriptive, doctrinal legal 
test—as opposed to a descriptive or predictive analysis.48 Network 
science has been one of the most important methodological devel-
opments in both the natural and social sciences in recent dec-
ades.49 Network science methodology has slowly made its way into 
empirical legal studies. Most empirical legal studies applying this 
methodology, however, have been descriptive or predictive.50 For 
example, in patent law, scholars have used network science to 
 
 43 See Part III.C. 
 44 See Part II.D. 
 45 See Part III.D. 
 46 See id. 
 47 See Part III.E. 
 48 In law, scholars have begun applying networks in a variety of ways but most of 
them have been descriptive. See, for example, Ryan Whalen, Legal Networks: The Prom-
ises and Challenges of Legal Network Analysis, 2016 Mich St L Rev 539, 556, 559–65. 
 49 For a description of the varied and powerful uses of network science, see David 
Easley and Jon Kleinberg, Networks, Crowds, and Markets: Reasoning About a Highly 
Connected World 7–17 (Cambridge 2010). 
 50 See, for example, Whalen, 2016 Mich St L Rev at 556 (cited in note 48); text  
accompanying notes 201–05. 
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predict the emergence of new technologies,51 or as a tool in patent 
valuation.52 Previous studies on the importance of incentivizing 
boundary-crossing innovations, including work by Professor 
Michal Shur-Ofry53 and some of our prior work,54 have theorized 
on the desirability of using patent data to identify breakthrough 
interdisciplinary innovations, but have not in fact developed or 
validated such a metric. In this Article, we provide an example of 
how network science can be used to create measures or algo-
rithms that can help guide normative decision-making. We also 
explore the importance of algorithmic design choices, providing 
insight into challenges facing the legal system as computationally 
enabled decision-making tools begin to proliferate. 
This Article proceeds by first examining, in Part I, the doctri-
nal and theoretical foundations of the nonobviousness require-
ment. We focus on two concerns that have guided the develop-
ment of nonobviousness doctrine and theory: the friction between 
cognitive and economic conceptualizations of nonobviousness, 
and the difficulties in crafting a doctrinal test that both protects 
against hindsight bias while giving due weight to market forces 
that spur innovation without patent protection. In Part II, we 
then introduce a network perspective on innovation, and explore 
how it can both help us understand what it means for something 
to be obvious, and how that understanding can be reconciled with 
previous attempts to theorize nonobviousness from an economic 
and psychological perspective. In Part III, we use our network 
 
 51 See, for example, Péter Érdi, et al, Prediction of Emerging Technologies Based on 
Analysis of the US Patent Citation Network, 95 Scientometrics 225, 231–34 (2013) (devel-
oping a methodology to predict the emergence of new technological fields through the US 
patent citation network); Katherine J. Strandburg, et al, Law and the Science of Networks: 
An Overview and an Application to the “Patent Explosion”, 21 Berkeley Tech L J 1293, 
1329–39 (2006) (studying the evolution of the patent citation network, and arguing that 
patents—at the time of the study—were increasingly being granted for trivial improve-
ments); Katherine J. Strandburg, et al, Patent Citation Networks Revisited: Signs of a 
Twenty-First Century Change?, 87 NC L Rev 1657, 1671–79 (2009) (continuing the prior 
study of the evolution of the patent citation network to find that the trend toward triviality 
had leveled off). 
 52 See, for example, Andrew W. Torrance and Jevin D. West, All Patents Great and 
Small: A Big Data Network Approach to Valuation, 20 Va J L & Tech 466, 486–98 (2017). 
 53 Michal Shur-Ofry, Connect the Dots: Patents and Interdisciplinarity, 51 U Mich J 
L Ref 55, 76–84 (2017) (proposing that patent law should reward “technologies that con-
nect disparate dots and distinguish them from more ordinary combinations”). 
 54 See Laura G. Pedraza-Fariña, Patent Law and the Sociology of Innovation, 2013 
Wis L Rev 813, 861 (proposing that the nonobviousness doctrine should incentivize 
boundary-crossing innovation); Pedraza-Fariña, 70 SMU L Rev at 437 (cited in note 37) 
(arguing that “patent applicants before the PTO (or litigants before a court) could also 
introduce evidence that a particular patent employed a rare combination of technological 
subclasses as evidence of non-obviousness”). 
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theory of innovation to motivate a network measure of nonobvi-
ousness (what we term the network nonobviousness score, or 
NNOS). We apply the NNOS to four case examples, demonstrat-
ing that an empirical measure of nonobviousness that is grounded 
in network theory can provide objective insight into the patenta-
bility analysis that both leverages the vast stores of innovation 
data produced by the patent system and is also robust to hindsight 
bias. Finally, we illustrate alternative network measures of non-
obviousness, and discuss how these network measures can be re-
fined and integrated into the current doctrinal framework for non-
obviousness. In our Conclusion, we engage with debates around 
algorithmic bias and the perils of black box algorithms by discuss-
ing specific algorithmic design choices embedded in the NNOS. 
I.  A BRIEF HISTORY OF NONOBVIOUSNESS THEORY  
AND DOCTRINE 
In this Part, we reconstruct the history of nonobviousness 
theory and doctrine by focusing on two pivotal controversies that 
have shaped the direction of nonobviousness jurisprudence. The 
first controversy concerns the clash between economic and cogni-
tive approaches to the conceptual question: What does it mean for 
an invention to be nonobvious? We trace the development of judi-
cial decisions, focusing on their gradual transition from a cogni-
tive to an economic approach. Despite a growing trend to view 
nonobviousness from an economic perspective, modern nonobvi-
ousness decisions are best described as hybrids: relying on a blend 
of economic and cognitive justifications of nonobviousness. The 
second controversy concerns how to best measure nonobvious-
ness. More specifically, it concerns how to balance two competing 
concerns: counteracting hindsight bias—or the tendency to assign 
an incorrectly high probability of success to inventions when eval-
uated ex post, either during patent examination or litigation—
while preserving the flexibility that would allow fact finders to 
consider how market and other forces incentivize innovation 
without patent protection. 
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A. Doctrinal Evolution: From Cognitive to Economic 
Approaches 
The Supreme Court first articulated what would later become 
codified as the nonobviousness requirement in Hotchkiss v  
Greenwood.55 The invention at issue in Hotchkiss—a clay or porce-
lain doorknob—met the two statutory requirements for patenta-
bility at that time, novelty and utility.56 The invention was, how-
ever, a substitution of a well-known doorknob material (wood or 
metal) for another (clay or porcelain).57 Finding such substitution 
to be “the work of the skillful mechanic, not that of the inventor,”58 
the Court both refused to grant a patent on that particular inven-
tion and announced a new rule that proved to be deeply influen-
tial: “[U]nless more ingenuity and skill . . . were required . . . than 
were possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the 
business,” the patent was void.59 This new rule in fact added a 
third requirement of “a degree of skill and ingenuity” to the two 
existing statutory requirements that an invention be both useful 
and new.60 
The opinion’s short analysis of this new patentability require-
ment, however, left the door open for two possible—and diver-
gent—interpretations. Does patentability require a showing of 
subjective creativity or “creative genius,” compared to the lower 
level of creativity possessed by an “ordinary mechanic”? Or is the 
inquiry an objective search for substantial advances in the art? 
And, if the inquiry is objective, does proving a substantial ad-
vance require a showing of objective insight or creativity (a cogni-
tive interpretation) or is the inquiry a search for advances in the 
art that require the (economic) inducement of a patent?61 
 
 55 Hotchkiss, 52 US at 248, 267. 
 56 Id at 264–65. 
 57 See id at 264. 
 58 Id at 267. 
 59 Hotchkiss, 52 US at 267. 
 60 Id. 
 61 See, for example, Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Analyze This: A Law and Economics 
Agenda for the Patent System, 53 Vand L Rev 2081, 2092 (2000):  
In a formulation that has resonated with the courts, the nonobviousness stand-
ard distinguishes the unpatentable work of the “ordinary mechanic” from the 
patentable advances of more insightful inventors. One way of understanding 
this distinction is that patents are unnecessary to bring about mundane im-
provements that are within easy [cognitive] reach of those working in the field, 
but may be needed to motivate inventors to pursue the nonobvious advances that 
require something beyond routine work. This suggests that the nature of  
the inventive effort leading up to the invention may have a bearing on its  
patentability. 
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Some decisions following Hotchkiss embraced a subjective in-
quiry: focusing on the cognitive processes taking place in the mind 
of the inventor and looking for a “flash of creative genius” to merit 
patent protection.62 In the most notable decision embodying the 
subjective approach, Cuno Engineering Corp v Automatic Devices 
Corp,63 the Court denied a patent on the first cordless automobile 
cigarette lighter because the new device, in the words of Justice 
William O. Douglas, did not “reveal the flash of creative genius,” 
but rather reflected “merely the skill of the calling.”64 Under 
Cuno’s subjective standard, the inventor’s own mental processes 
in devising the invention played an outsized role. The subjective 
standard thus privileged invention stories that involved unex-
plainable “flashes of insight,” or those proverbial “Eureka!” mo-
ments that occur when the inventor least expects them. Cuno’s 
subjective standard was widely criticized as inconsistent with pa-
tent law’s utilitarian justification that focuses instead on achiev-
ing social benefits through the promotion of innovation, regard-
less of whether such innovation came about through painstaking 
research or a moment of inspired insight.65 
Although Cuno appeared to adopt a subjective perspective, 
other decisions following Hotchkiss had taken an objective ap-
proach, requiring that the invention represent a significant 
enough technical improvement over the existing art. For example, 
in Atlantic Works, an early Supreme Court case that came on the 
heels of the Hotchkiss decision, the Court emphasized how the 
utilitarian underpinnings of patent law required that patents 
only “reward those who make some [objectively] substantial dis-
covery or invention, which adds to our knowledge and makes a 
step in advance in the useful arts.”66 Atlantic Works also stands 
out as one of the earliest cases to emphasize what we would now 
 
See also Abramowicz and Duffy, 120 Yale L J at 1604–12 (cited in note 4) (arguing that 
both “courts and commentators have tended to assume, implicitly or explicitly, that the 
doctrine focuses on the degree of cognitive difficulty in conceiving the invention” but em-
phasizing that “economic factors that make the process of developing something new more 
or less difficult” should take center stage in nonobviousness determinations). 
 62 See Cuno Engineering Corp v Automatic Devices Corp, 314 US 84, 91 (1941) (hold-
ing that a patentable invention “must reveal the flash of creative genius, not merely the 
skill of the calling”). 
 63 314 US 84 (1941). 
 64 Id at 91. 
 65 See, for example, Aram Boyajian, The Flash of Creative Genius: An Alternative 
Interpretation, 25 J Patent Office Society 776, 776–78 (1943) (summarizing contemporary 
criticisms of the Cuno decision). 
 66 Atlantic Works, 107 US at 200. 
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consider an economic view of nonobviousness: the idea that mar-
ket forces create a baseline demand for routine, spontaneous im-
provements that require no patent inducement.67 Atlantic Works, 
like many other decisions that followed, however, answered the 
conceptual question—what counts as a substantial advance?—
with a blended economic and objective cognitive test. Under such 
a blended approach, a substantial advance was one that both 
evinced “the exercise of invention, somewhat above ordinary me-
chanical or engineering skill”68 (a cognitive test), and that would 
not be the “natural and proper outgrowth” of market demand 
forces (an economic test).69 Atlantic Works’s cognitive test was ob-
jective (in contraposition to Cuno’s subjective test) because it 
sought to find out whether, in the eyes of an expert in the field, 
the advance at issue demonstrated a level of objective skill or cre-
ativity beyond the field’s “average” skill level. In this Article, 
when we discuss the clash between economic and cognitive ap-
proaches, we refer to this objective version of the cognitive test.70 
One way to interpret the blending of cognitive and economic 
rationales is to think of objective cognitive tests as “proxies” or 
shortcuts for identifying inventions that require the economic in-
ducement of a patent. As we argue in more detail in Part I.B, this 
interpretation is most consistent with the utilitarian rationale for 
granting patents embedded in the Constitution.71 It is also justi-
fied under the model of innovation that we develop in Part II, but 
only for a specific type of innovation (boundary-crossing innova-
tion). What is problematic about Atlantic Works and the many 
decisions that follow that continue to use this blended approach, 
however, is that this “proxy” rationale is never made explicit. Ra-
ther, the cognitive and economic rationales are implicitly taken 
to be one and the same. Yet, as advances in the fields of economics 
and psychology make clear, there are key underlying normative 
differences between these two approaches that can lead to differ-
ent prescriptive outcomes. A cognitive (or psychological) approach 
 
 67 Id at 199–200 (“It was never the object of those laws to grant a monopoly for  
every trifling device, every shadow of a shade of an idea, which would naturally and  
spontaneously occur to any skilled mechanic or operator in the ordinary progress of  
manufactures.”). 
 68 Id at 200. 
 69 Id at 199. 
 70 Other authors have referred to what we call the economic approach as a “contex-
tual approach,” and to what we call the cognitive approach as a “technological” approach. 
Meurer and Strandburg, 12 Lewis & Clark L Rev at 571–72 (cited in note 28). 
 71 See US Const Art I, § 8, cl 8 (“[The Congress shall have power] [t]o promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inven-
tors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”). 
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asks: Could an average practitioner think of (or predict) this out-
come ex ante? Is this innovation creative? In contrast, an eco-
nomic approach asks: Are market incentives sufficient to bring 
about this innovation? Some creative inventions may not need the 
economic inducement of a patent. Conversely, some uncreative 
but time- and labor-intensive inventions may not come to be ab-
sent such patent inducement. In short, a cognitive test will not 
always serve as a good proxy for an economic inducement  
standard. 
The doctrinal debates that emerged following Hotchkiss mo-
tivated congressional action to codify the nonobviousness stand-
ard in the 1952 Patent Act.72 Under this Act, any new and useful 
invention would nonetheless be deemed unpatentable if it “would 
have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person 
having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter per-
tains.”73 The 1952 Act eliminated subjective tests of patentability, 
emphasizing that “[p]atentability shall not be negatived by the 
manner in which the invention was made.”74 
Following the passage of the 1952 Patent Act, the Supreme 
Court addressed the nonobviousness standard’s underlying theo-
retical foundations at two crucial time points: in 1966, when the 
Court in Graham v John Deere Co of Kansas City75 addressed the 
nonobviousness requirement following the passage of the 1952 
Patent Act,76 and in 2007, when the Court in KSR reviewed the 
Federal Circuit’s interpretation of its prior decisions on nonobvi-
ousness.77 An analysis of these two decisions reveals a Court that 
 
 72 66 Stat 792, codified as amended in various sections of Title 35. See Graham, 383 
US at 15 (finding that the 1952 Patent Act was passed to have a “stabilizing effect” on the 
interpretations of the nonobviousness requirement), quoting HR Rep 1293, 82d Cong, 2d 
Sess 7 (1952). For examples of the contemporary debate and disagreement surrounding 
obviousness, see Radiator Specialty Co v Buhot, 39 F2d 373, 376 (3d Cir 1930) (“It is with 
the inventive concept, the thing achieved, not with the manner of its achievement or the 
quality of the mind which gave it birth, that the patent law concerns itself.”); Chicago Steel 
Foundry Co v Burnside Steel Foundry Co, 132 F2d 812, 817 (7th Cir 1943) (“The test of a 
‘flash of genius’ should be rejected.”); John A. Dienner, The “Flash of Genius” Concept: Is 
It a Sound Standard?, 195 J Commerce 39, 40 (Mar 11, 1943) (“The Supreme Court was 
asked . . . to reconsider and abandon the ‘[flash of genius] doctrine’ but declined to do so. 
Since the judiciary appears thereby to have invaded the exclusive province of Congress, a 
legislative declaration of policy by the Congress appears to be in order, and should be 
sought.”). 
 73 35 USC § 103. 
 74 35 USC § 103. 
 75 383 US 1 (1966). 
 76 Id at 12–15. 
 77 KSR, 550 US at 415–18. In the intervening years, the Court also addressed non-
obviousness in two additional decisions: Anderson’s-Black Rock, Inc v Pavement Salvage 
Co, 396 US 57, 62–63 (1969) (finding that an invention was not patentable because “those 
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has more explicitly endorsed an economic view of nonobviousness 
while still consistently—and likely also inadvertently—continu-
ing to blend cognitive and economic justifications. 
The Court in Graham sought to clarify the relationship be-
tween the nonobviousness requirement as codified in the 1952  
Patent Act and the line of cases following Hotchkiss.78 Graham 
rejected the subjective interpretation of nonobviousness arising 
from Cuno, that would focus on the mental steps taken to achieve 
the invention.79 But the Court justified its objective formulation 
using both cognitive and economic perspectives. Thus, the Court 
clarified the holding of Cuno as requiring that “the subject matter 
sought to be patented . . . be beyond the skill of the calling”—an 
objective cognitive perspective akin to that of Atlantic Works.80 On 
the other hand, the Court famously defined the ultimate goal of 
the nonobviousness inquiry in clear economic terms: nonobvious-
ness serves as a “means of weeding out those inventions which 
would not be disclosed or devised but for the inducement of a  
patent.”81 
Forty-one years later, in KSR, the Court returned to the topic 
of nonobviousness in a much-changed patent landscape. In the 
years since Graham, the system of patent law had undergone a 
seismic structural change: no longer the province of fractured cir-
cuit courts, all patent appeals had since 1982 been concentrated 
into a single circuit—the Federal Circuit.82 This concentration 
brought with it a revolution in patent jurisprudence. The Federal 
Circuit, taking seriously its mandate to “reduce the widespread 
lack of uniformity and uncertainty of legal doctrine that exists in 
 
skilled in the art [would conclude that] the use of the old elements in combination was not 
an invention by the obvious-nonobvious standard”) and Sakraida v Ag Pro, Inc, 425 US 
273, 280–82 (1976) (invalidating a patent because “[e]xploitation of . . . gravity adds noth-
ing to the sum of useful knowledge where there is no change in the respective functions of 
the elements of the combination; this particular use of the assembly of old elements would 
be obvious to any person skilled in the art of mechanical application”). But these decisions 
have played a less prominent role in the nonobviousness canon. 
 78 Graham, 383 US at 14. 
 79 Id at 15–17. 
 80 Id at 15 n 7. The Court also cited with approval a reformulation of the nonobvious-
ness doctrine that would expressly link the nonobviousness standard to an invention- 
focused creativity threshold, by explaining nonobviousness as requiring that “the device 
. . . reveal the ‘flash of [objectively] creative genius.’” Id. 
 81 Id at 11. 
 82 Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub L No 97-164, 96 Stat 25, codified as 
amended in various sections of Title 28. 
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the administration of patent law,”83 set out to actively reshape ex-
isting patent law doctrines. With its heightened status as the 
“gatekeeper” of the patent system, the nonobviousness doctrine 
was a prime target of such doctrinal reshaping. Much of the  
Federal Circuit’s new jurisprudence on nonobviousness, however, 
concerned not so much the definition of nonobviousness as its 
measurement. The Federal Circuit was particularly concerned 
with achieving uniformity and predictability in nonobviousness 
decisions by eliminating hindsight bias, which was thought to 
prejudice fact finders toward finding most inventions obvious.84 
To address hindsight bias, the Federal Circuit developed a rigid 
rule, the teaching-suggestion-or-motivation (TSM) test, directed 
at reducing fact finder discretion.85 It was to address whether this 
rigid rule was consistent with the Graham framework that the 
Supreme Court returned to the nonobviousness doctrine in KSR.86 
The invention in KSR concerned an adjustable automotive 
pedal system with a modular electric sensor (rather than a me-
chanical sensor).87 The key nonobviousness question was whether 
it would have been obvious to a person having ordinary skill in 
the art to modify existing adjustable pedals with an electronic 
sensor, given the exogenous development of electronic sensor 
technology.88 In rejecting the Federal Circuit’s rigid TSM test, and 
finding the invention obvious, the Court employed a decidedly 
economic view of nonobviousness. Specifically, the Court focused 
on the impact of “design incentives and other market forces” in 
 
 83 Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit Act of 1981, HR Rep 97-312, 97th Cong, 
1st Sess 23. 
 84 See, for example, Polaris Industries, Inc v Arctic Cat, Inc, 882 F3d 1056, 1068 (Fed 
Cir 2018) (“‘[T]he prejudice of hindsight bias’ often overlooks that the ‘genius of invention 
is often a combination of known elements which in hindsight seems preordained.’”), quot-
ing Power Integrations, Inc v Fairchild Semiconductor International, Inc, 711 F3d 1348, 
1368 (Fed Cir 2013). 
 85 Under the TSM test, courts asked whether the prior art taught, suggested, or mo-
tivated the combination. If it did, then the invention was obvious. For a more detailed 
explanation, see the text accompanying notes 107–12. 
 86 The question presented was: 
Whether the Federal Circuit has erred in holding that a claimed invention can-
not be held “obvious,” and thus unpatentable under 35 USC § 103(a), in the ab-
sence of some proven “‘teaching, suggestion, or motivation’ that would have led 
a person of ordinary skill in the art to combine the relevant prior art teachings 
in the manner claimed.” 
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, KSR International Co v Teleflex Inc, No 04-1350, *i  
(US filed Apr 6, 2015) (available on Westlaw at 2005 WL 835463). 
 87 KSR, 550 US at 406, 409–11. 
 88 Id at 424–25 (“The proper question to have asked was whether a pedal designer of 
ordinary skill, facing the wide range of needs created by developments in the field of  
endeavor, would have seen a benefit to upgrading [the pedal system] with a sensor.”). 
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prompting innovation without the need for a patent incentive.89 
The Court largely rests its holding on a succinct economic justifi-
cation for the doctrine: “There then existed a marketplace that 
created a strong incentive to convert mechanical pedals to elec-
tronic pedals, and the prior art taught a number of methods for 
achieving this advance.”90 In other words, an invention is nonob-
vious only when the market fails to incentivize that particular  
invention. 
Despite its strong economic underpinnings, the Court in KSR 
continued to blend economic and cognitive perspectives. For ex-
ample, the opinion used cognitive or psychological concepts to con-
trast inventions displaying “ordinary skill” and “ordinary creativ-
ity,” which are undeserving of patent protection, with those that 
result from “real innovation,” which should be granted patent pro-
tection.91 The opinion’s concluding paragraph also suggests a cog-
nitive rationale for nonobviousness: “KSR provided convincing ev-
idence that mounting a modular sensor on a fixed pivot point of 
the Asano pedal was a design step well within the grasp of a per-
son of ordinary skill in the relevant art.”92 In other words, an or-
dinary artisan of “ordinary creativity”93 could cognitively imagine 
the invention at the outset. 
In summary, the doctrinal answer to the conceptual ques-
tion—what makes an invention nonobvious?—is a blend of cogni-
tive and economic rationales, with an economic understanding of 
nonobviousness becoming more prominent in the most recent Su-
preme Court decisions. How we define nonobviousness has clear 
implications for how we measure it: Should nonobviousness rely 
on ascertaining how creative a particular invention is? Or should 
it instead focus on mapping the strength of existing market and 
social forces at the time of the invention to determine whether it 
would have been achieved regardless of patent incentives? We 
next turn to explore in more detail the judicial answer to this 
measurement question: the specific doctrinal framework that has 
evolved to determine whether an invention clears the nonobvious-
ness threshold. We pay particular attention to an important dis-
agreement between the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court 
regarding how to simultaneously correct for hindsight bias while 
 
 89 Id at 417. 
 90 Id at 424. 
 91 KSR, 550 US at 419–20. 
 92 Id at 427 (emphasis added). 
 93 Id at 421. 
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taking into account market forces that foster innovation without 
patent protection. 
The Court in Graham laid out the basic tripartite doctrinal 
framework for nonobviousness that we still use today. First, the 
scope and content of the prior art must be determined.94 The 
“scope and content” inquiry requires identifying the collection of 
all publicly available knowledge that an ordinary mechanic—or 
“person having ordinary skill in the art” (PHOSITA)—would ra-
tionally consult when attempting to carry out her invention.95 Un-
like the novelty inquiry, in which every single piece of publicly 
available knowledge is considered “prior art,”96 the nonobvious-
ness inquiry recognizes that inventors are only likely able to rely 
upon and recombine knowledge within their specific fields of en-
deavor, or in fields that are rationally related to the problem they 
are trying to solve.97 Therefore, prior art for nonobviousness pur-
poses is cabined to such “analogous” prior art.98 Second, the dif-
ferences between this prior art and the claimed invention must 
be ascertained in light of, third, the level of ordinary skill in the 
pertinent art.99 
In essence, the Graham framework calls on fact finders to put 
themselves in the shoes of a PHOSITA and, from this perspective, 
gather all relevant publicly available information that a 
PHOSITA would reasonably consult to solve her problem, and de-
termine whether the differences between the invention at issue 
and the prior art knowledge are such that the invention reflects a 
sufficiently inventive, non-trivial step to merit patent protection. 
The Court in Graham also emphasized that “secondary consider-
ations” of nonobviousness, such as “commercial success, long felt 
but unsolved needs, [and] failure of others,” “may have relevancy” 
 
 94 Graham, 383 US at 17. 
 95 See, for example, In re Winslow, 365 F2d 1017, 1020 (CCPA 1966) (“We think the 
proper way to apply the 103 obviousness test to a case like this is to first picture the in-
ventor as working in his shop with the prior art references—which he is presumed to 
know—hanging on the walls around him.”). 
 96 See, for example, In re Robertson, 169 F3d 743, 745 (Fed Cir 1999) (“Anticipation 
under 35 USC § 102(e) requires that ‘each and every element as set forth in the claim is 
found, either expressly or inherently described, in a single prior art reference.’”), quoting 
Verdegaal Bros, Inc v Union Oil Co, 814 F2d 628, 631 (Fed Cir 1987). 
 97 In re Bigio, 381 F3d 1320, 1325 (Fed Cir 2004). 
 98 Two criteria are relevant in determining whether prior art is analogous: 
“(1) whether the art is from the same field of endeavor, regardless of the problem ad-
dressed and, (2) if the reference is not within the field of the inventor’s endeavor, whether 
the reference still is reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with which the inven-
tor is involved.” Id at 1325. 
 99 Graham, 383 US at 17. 
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as “indicia of obviousness.”100 In more recent caselaw, this list of 
secondary considerations—which the Federal Circuit has also 
termed “objective indicia of nonobviousness”—has expanded101 
and taken a crucial role as a mandatory fourth prong in Graham’s 
tripartite framework.102 
Although Graham firmly rejects a subjective approach to 
nonobviousness that would focus on the mental qualities of the 
inventor,103 the objective approach it adopts is susceptible to sub-
jective biases on the part of the fact finder. One well-documented 
bias in particular—hindsight bias—has come to take center stage 
in modern-day doctrinal debates. Because a nonobviousness de-
termination must take place in the ex ante world just prior to the 
invention, it requires fact finders to disregard the ex post fact that 
the invention actually took place.104 Hindsight bias—people’s sub-
jective and unconscious tendency to incorrectly assign a high pre-
dictability to a past event based on their present knowledge that 
the event has, in fact, occurred—makes this exercise very diffi-
cult.105 In other words, in hindsight, most inventions are cogni-
tively obvious. Hindsight bias can also affect a purely economic 
nonobviousness inquiry. In practice, whether a person or entity 
would “find it economically obvious to undertake the research 
necessary for success,”106 requires understanding how a re-
searcher would have reacted to market forces present at the time 
of the invention. Absent clear, objective market demand and firm 
behavior data, fact finders’ assessments of the likelihood the mar-
ket would have given rise to the invention are likely to be inflated 
by seeing the finished, successful invention. 
Concerned about the impact of hindsight bias on innovation 
incentives, the Federal Circuit’s nonobviousness jurisprudence 
 
 100 Id at 17–18. 
 101 See, for example, Environmental Designs, Ltd v Union Oil Co of California, 713 
F2d 693, 697–98 (Fed Cir 1983) (using “expressions of disbelief” by experts as an objective 
indicator). 
 102 See, for example, Intercontinental Great Brands LLC v Kellogg North America Co, 
869 F3d 1336, 1345–47 (Fed Cir 2017) (explaining that “objective indicia is evidence to be 
weighed in the overall legal determination of obviousness”). 
 103 See Graham, 383 US at 15 (“It also seems apparent that Congress intended by the 
last sentence of § 103 to abolish the test it believed this Court announced in the contro-
versial phrase ‘flash of creative genius,’ used in Cuno.”). 
 104 In a series of articles, Professor Gregory Mandel has tested the effect of hindsight 
on nonobviousness decisions. See generally Mandel, 67 Ohio St L J 1391 (cited in note 26); 
Gregory N. Mandel, A Nonobvious Comparison: Nonobviousness Decisions at the PTAB 
and in the Federal Courts, 24 Tex Intell Prop L J 403 (2016). 
 105 See Mandel, 12 Lewis & Clark L Rev at 336–37 (cited in note 6). 
 106 Abramowicz and Duffy, 120 Yale L J at 1655 (cited in note 4). 
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has focused on eliminating hindsight bias and increasing the pre-
dictability of the nonobviousness doctrine through the TSM 
test.107 The TSM test provided a gloss on the Graham framework 
that required a specific finding that “the prior art would have  
suggested to one of ordinary skill in the art that [a particular com-
bination of references] should be carried out and would have a 
reasonable likelihood of success.”108 In its strictest application, the 
TSM test required the PTO and courts to make a “clear and par-
ticular”109 showing of a suggestion to combine prior art references 
by “point[ing] to particular items of prior art that concretely sug-
gest[ed] how to combine all of the features of a claimed inven-
tion.”110 In short, under the TSM test, a showing of obviousness 
required that the prior art explicitly suggest the particular recom-
bination present in the invention.111 Under this test—recourse to 
common sense, which may suggest that an invention was an ob-
vious combination of existing prior art—was an impermissible ex-
ercise in hindsight bias.112 
An important shortcoming of the TSM test, however, was 
that it ignored the tacit, unarticulated knowledge available to in-
ventors. To guard against hindsight bias, the TSM test treated 
persons of skill in the art as unable to take any steps beyond what 
was explicitly articulated in existing prior art references. The 
TSM test also all but erased considerations about the impact of 
market and social forces on innovation without patent protection. 
The Federal Circuit’s reliance on the TSM test as the sole test for 
patent nonobviousness was ultimately challenged before the  
Supreme Court in KSR. 
In KSR, the Supreme Court criticized the TSM test as “rigid” 
and inflexible—leading to excessive patent grants that stifled  
 
 107 See, for example, Loctite Corp v Ultraseal Ltd, 781 F2d 861, 873 (Fed Cir 1985) 
(“In patent cases, the need for express Graham findings takes on an especially significant 
role because of an occasional tendency of district courts to depart from the Graham test, 
and from the statutory standard of unobviousness that it helps determine, to the tempting 
but forbidden zone of hindsight.”); In re Dembiczak, 175 F3d 994, 999 (Fed Cir 1999) (em-
phasizing the importance of a “rigorous application of the requirement for a showing of 
the teaching or motivation to combine prior art references” to combat the “subtle but pow-
erful attraction of a hindsight-based obviousness analysis”). 
 108 Brown and Williamson Tobacco Corp v Philip Morris, Inc, 229 F3d 1120, 1124 (Fed 
Cir 2000) (emphasis added). 
 109 Dembiczak, 175 F3d at 999. 
 110 Federal Trade Commission, To Promote Innovation: The Proper Balance of  
Competition and Patent Law and Policy *12 (Oct 2003), archived at https://perma.cc/ 
PS4T-GWND. 
 111 See Dembiczak, 175 F3d at 999. 
 112 Id at 999–1000. 
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follow-on innovation.113 In its stead, the Court called for a return 
to the tripartite Graham framework and a focus on those eco-
nomic and “common sense” factors that would indicate whether 
an innovation would likely take place without patent protec-
tion.114 For example, the Court emphasized the importance of un-
derstanding that “design incentives and other market forces,”115 
as well as exogenous technological developments may prompt or-
dinary artisans to combine references, especially if those combi-
nations lead to predictable results.116 The Court also emphasized 
that a PHOSITA is not an “automaton” devoid of any creativity; 
rather, a PHOSITA can be expected to take incremental inventive 
steps.117 Applying these common sense and economic elements to 
the particular facts before it, the Court in KSR held that adding an 
electronic sensor to a moveable vehicle pedal assembly was obvious 
in light of the exogenous technological development of electronic 
sensors, and the increasing market demand for modifying adjusta-
ble vehicle pedal assemblies with such electronic sensors.118 
The KSR framework corrected important mistakes in TSM 
jurisprudence by curtailing patent grants for insignificant inven-
tions in crowded fields, or in inventions for which market forces 
or exogenous technological developments were sufficient incen-
tives.119 Yet, KSR’s flexible framework also increased the overall 
unpredictability of patent nonobviousness decisions. One aspect 
of KSR in particular—its endorsement of the use of “common 
sense”—has injected hindsight bias back into the nonobviousness 
analysis. While seemingly endorsing an economic view of nonob-
viousness, the Court in KSR left unclear how to incorporate an 
understanding of “design incentives and other market forces”120 
into the nonobviousness analysis: How should judges attempt  
to measure such market forces? When are market forces  
sufficient to tip the balance toward obviousness? This indetermi-
nacy has opened the door for an increasing reliance on judicial  
“common sense” that may not reflect economic realities. Empiri-
cal data on nonobviousness decisions post-KSR indicate that both 
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district courts and the Federal Circuit are indeed increasingly re-
lying on “common sense” or on “the nature of the problem facing 
the inventor” to explain why a particular combination of refer-
ences should be found obvious.121 And, taking to heart the  
Supreme Court’s admonition to consider a PHOSITA’s ability to 
think creatively, the Federal Circuit has become more likely to 
uphold a district court’s finding of obviousness than a finding of  
nonobviousness.122 
* * * 
These two ways of conceptualizing nonobviousness that 
emerged in doctrinal cases have their counterparts in the aca-
demic literature, reflected in two strands of theoretical writings: 
one emphasizing how to use insights from economics to define 
nonobviousness, the other emphasizing how to integrate psycho-
logical research on creativity to the nonobviousness inquiry. In 
turn, these two theoretical frameworks generate different doctri-
nal prescriptions for how to measure nonobviousness in specific 
cases. The next Section provides brief analyses of these two theo-
retical perspectives. 
B. Theoretical Perspectives: Economic and Psychological 
Models of Nonobviousness 
Law and economics scholars have advanced a number of mod-
els to explain and justify the nonobviousness requirement. What 
all of these models have in common is a recognition that patents 
should be granted only in cases of market failure, that is, when 
market forces alone are insufficient to bring about the invention. 
Where they differ is in the variables that they emphasize as pre-
dictive of such market failures. Below we describe three models, 
which we term: (1) the “uncertainty” model; (2) the “social value” 
model; and (3) the “inducement” model. 
 
 121 See, for example, Rantanen, 16 Stan Tech L Rev at 759–60 (cited in note 119) 
(“Almost every time the Federal Circuit has applied a reason to combine analysis since 
KSR, it has articulated the requirement in such a way that places no limits, express or 
implied, on how it may be satisfied.”). 
 122 Id at 744–45 (“[T]he Federal Circuit is giving greater deference when lower tribu-
nals reach conclusions that patents are obvious.”); Jennifer Nock and Sreekar Gadde, 
Raising the Bar for Nonobviousness: An Empirical Study of Federal Circuit Case Law Fol-
lowing KSR, 20 Fed Cir Bar J 369, 371, 399–400 (2011) (“The Federal Circuit is now much 
less likely to reverse a lower-tribunal finding that a patent is obvious than a finding that 
a patent is nonobvious.”). 
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Professor Robert Merges has proposed an “uncertainty-
based” economic model of nonobviousness.123 In this model, the 
nonobviousness standard would “reward[ ] one who successfully 
invents when the uncertainty facing her prior to the invention 
makes it more likely than not that the invention won’t succeed.”124 
The model goes on to tie uncertainty to cost: because uncertainty 
regarding the success of a particular invention or idea is costly to 
dispel, firms will prefer—all other things being equal—to invest 
in inventions with low uncertainty (and therefore low cost).125 In 
this view, the nonobviousness doctrine prevents the patenting of 
low-hanging fruit: those inventions that are not costly to discover 
and develop because of a low likelihood of failure.126 This “uncer-
tainty” view of nonobviousness is consistent with the economic 
perspective that underlies both the Graham and KSR decisions. 
KSR in particular emphasizes the role of “predictability” in as-
sessing nonobviousness: “If a person of ordinary skill [in the art] 
can implement a predictable variation,” and would see the benefit 
of doing so, “§ 103 likely bars its patentability.”127 A renewed em-
phasis on predictability, understood as the likelihood that a par-
ticular research path will be successful ex ante, aligns with the 
uncertainty model. 
A second model, the social value model, views the role of non-
obviousness as nudging inventors to pursue more technically dif-
ficult, socially preferred research projects.128 A key insight of this 
model is that, in a world without the nonobviousness doctrine, 
firms would consistently choose to pursue those research projects 
that maximize the difference between expected private value and 
cost.129 From a utilitarian perspective, however, governments 
grant patents to incentivize socially optimal—not just privately 
optimal—investment. Socially optimal projects, however, tend to 
 
 123 Merges, 7 High Tech L J at 19–20, 34 (cited in note 28). 
 124 Id at 19 (emphasis omitted). A related interpretation of risk, advanced by Profes-
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be more technically ambitious than privately optimal ones.130 
Therefore, the nonobviousness doctrine can be conceptualized as 
a tool to shift the choice of research projects toward socially pre-
ferred ones.131 The first and second models are in fact linked: So-
cially optimal innovation tends to be more technically difficult, 
more costly, and more risky than the privately optimal alterna-
tives.132 On the other hand, privately optimal projects may consist 
of small tweaks or improvements to already commercially suc-
cessful (or already commercially established) products, rather 
than breakthrough or disruptive innovation.133 
Finally, Professors Michael Abramowicz, John Duffy, and 
Tun-Jen Chiang have developed inducement models that seek to 
operationalize the economic standard articulated by the Court in 
Graham.134 Their reformulation of the standard contains two im-
portant refinements. First, they incorporate the element of time, 
seeking to identify those inventions which would not have been 
disclosed or devised for a substantial period of time, as deserving 
of patent protection.135 Second, the inducement model embraces 
 
 130 Id at 549 (“[W]here, as is realistically nearly always the case, the social value of 
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an economic definition of a PHOSITA that focuses on whether, in 
the absence of patents, a person or entity would “find it economi-
cally obvious to undertake the research necessary for success.”136 
This refinement is an important departure from current doctrinal 
practice—indeed, it is in their definition of a PHOSITA as an ar-
tisan of “ordinary skill” that cognitive understandings of nonob-
viousness remain embedded into the nonobviousness doctrine.137 
This economic definition of a PHOSITA also incorporates con-
cerns about uncertainty and cost, and is therefore compatible 
with Merges’s view of nonobviousness as incentivizing uncertain 
innovation. A highly uncertain and/or costly innovation would 
likely not be economically obvious absent patent protection.138 
Similarly, a socially optimal research path (under the social value 
model) would likely be economically nonobvious when compared 
to the privately optimal path. 
In contraposition to the other two economic models which do 
not seek to turn their insights into specific doctrinal frameworks, 
the inducement model identifies particular economic contexts that 
are likely to facilitate invention without patent protection.139 Spe-
cifically, Abramowicz and Duffy note that inventions are likely ob-
vious when they take place (1) after a surge of market demand; and 
(2) as a by-product of exogenous technological developments.140 
These three economic approaches to nonobviousness, how-
ever, have struggled to develop doctrinal tests that can easily and 
accurately capture instances of market failures. Many of the con-
textual economic factors needed to assess the economic nonobvi-
ousness of an invention are quite hard, if not impossible, for the 
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PTO to evaluate.141 For instance, Abramowicz and Duffy empha-
size that a surge of market demand just prior to the invention 
strongly suggests that the invention is economically obvious.142 
But assessing market demand is outside the expertise of patent 
examiners. The same is true of assessing whether an exogenous 
technological advance took place around the date of invention. 
Such an assessment requires the type of meta-analysis of innova-
tion trends that the PTO is not equipped to carry out. Courts can 
fare better in making this type of economic analysis. Neverthe-
less, the Federal Circuit has used flawed heuristics to assess ex-
isting market forces (such as the commercial success of an inven-
tion, or its unexpected results), failing to engage with an in-depth 
analysis of market shocks or exogenous factors.143 Proponents of 
the economic approach themselves have warned against facile ap-
plications of economic theory and called for the gathering of addi-
tional empirical data to develop objective nonobviousness 
measures.144 
Psychological theories of nonobviousness share a fundamen-
tal concern with economic perspectives: the goal of patent law 
should be to incentivize socially valuable innovation.145 Thus, psy-
chological perspectives on nonobviousness begin with the insight 
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that innovation and creativity are inextricably linked. Proponents 
of a psychological perspective view the core of intellectual prop-
erty law (and patent law in particular) as concerned with provid-
ing inventors incentives to act creatively.146 Understanding how 
the creative process unfolds becomes crucial to designing a sys-
tem of incentives to promote creativity. Understanding the crea-
tive process also provides tools that complement more traditional 
economic analyses of innovation. Despite efforts by law and eco-
nomic scholars to operationalize an economic view of patent law 
(and of nonobviousness in particular), it is often impossible to de-
termine whether, for any specific invention, a patent incentive 
was necessary to bring it about.147 As Professor Jeanne Fromer 
argues, “By examining creativity, the activity that copyright and 
patent law each seek to stimulate, instead of examining the eco-
nomic impact of these laws, we can begin to understand better 
how to structure these laws to induce valuable creativity.”148 
Psychologists generally agree on a core definition of creativity 
that contains two elements: (1) novelty and (2) appropriateness.149 
The concept of novelty is fairly self-explanatory: recreating or per-
forming someone else’s solution to a problem is not novel, and 
therefore not creative. Appropriateness refers to whether an idea 
is “recognized as socially valuable in some way to some commu-
nity,” and is therefore context dependent.150 Social psychologist 
Teresa Amabile adds a third element to her definition of creativ-
ity: (3) the task must be “heuristic rather than algorithmic.” As 
Amabile explains, “algorithmic tasks are those for which the path 
to the solution is clear and straightforward—tasks for which an 
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algorithm exists.”151 In contrast, “heuristic tasks are those not 
having a clear and readily identifiable path to solution—tasks for 
which algorithms must be developed.”152 The contrast between al-
gorithmic and heuristic tasks approximates the Supreme Court’s 
efforts in KSR to distinguish “ordinary” or “routine” from “real” 
innovation. Reframed as a psychological inquiry, the nonobvious-
ness doctrine would seek to reward, and therefore incentivize, 
those creative innovations that are not algorithmic—that is, those 
for which a clear, predictable path to a solution cannot be speci-
fied at the outset. 
One important insight in creativity research is that creative 
insights are often recombinations of mental concepts: the most 
creative of those recombinations tend to be those that combine 
distant, dissimilar concepts.153 This is because, as Professor Keith 
Sawyer explains, “When concepts are very different, you have to 
use the more complex [mental] strategies of property mapping or 
structure mapping, and these strategies result in the most novel 
and innovative combinations.”154 In other words, particularly cre-
ative inventions are often those that combine dissimilar concepts 
or ideas that have not previously been combined. As we argue in 
Part II.C, this particular type of creativity, in which disparate do-
mains are brought together, serves as a good proxy for economic 
nonobviousness. 
The mental processes involved in creative performance also 
include several biases that can impede both creative insights and 
an objective appreciation of such creative insights. As we dis-
cussed in the previous Section, doctrinal discussions of nonobvi-
ousness have focused on one particular bias—hindsight bias. 
Hindsight bias has been well-documented in the psychological 
and legal literature.155 The bias makes it impossible for an ob-
server (be it a judge or a jury), having access to the information 
relevant to solve a problem and to the correct framing of the prob-
lem that led to its solution, to fully appreciate moments of in-
sight.156 What psychological studies show is that hindsight bias is 
 
 151 Amabile, 45 J Personality & Soc Psychology at 360 (cited in note 149). 
 152 Id. 
 153 See Davidson and Greenberg, 12 Lewis & Clark L Rev at 533 (cited in note 30). 
 154 Sawyer, 12 Lewis & Clark L Rev at 467–68 (cited in note 30). 
 155 See generally Rebecca L. Guilbault, et al, A Meta-Analysis of Research on Hind-
sight Bias, 26 Basic & Applied Soc Psychology 103 (2004) (building on ninety-five prior 
studies of hindsight bias to conduct a meta-analysis of the phenomenon). 
 156 For studies documenting the effect of hindsight bias in patent proceedings, see 
generally Mandel, 67 Ohio St L J 1391 (cited in note 26); Mandel, 24 Tex Intell Prop L J 
403, 413–15, 425–26 (cited in note 104). 
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particularly problematic when creativity emerges from “mental 
restructuring”—the realization that previously overlooked infor-
mation is relevant for solving a problem or, conversely, that pieces 
of information are irrelevant (and distracting).157 Choosing what 
to pay attention to (and what not to) is crucial for problem solving, 
but patent examiners and judges always have before them all the 
relevant information necessary to solve the problem as framed by 
the inventor. In short, hindsight bias prevents observers from ap-
preciating truly creative inventions as such. 
Psychological theories of nonobviousness lead to a cognitive 
doctrinal framework aimed at identifying and rewarding creative 
inventions (in other words, those embodying novel, appropriate, 
and heuristic ideas) while avoiding hindsight bias that prevents 
observers from appreciating such creativity ex post. But psycho-
logical theorists have also struggled to translate these conceptual 
insights into easily applicable doctrinal frameworks. First,  
although psychological theory emphasizes the pervasiveness of 
hindsight bias, it provides no clear way to debias observers. To 
the contrary, most experiments on hindsight bias show it to be 
persistent and resistant to debiasing interventions.158 Second, cre-
ativity exists on a continuum, and psychological theories cannot 
answer the important question where to draw the line between 
obvious and nonobvious inventions or even how to measure where 
an invention might be on that creativity continuum. 
In brief, there are two theoretical answers to the conceptual 
question: What is a nonobvious invention? Both of them are re-
flected in judicial opinions. The first answer, an economic one, ties 
nonobviousness to market failures. Simply put, nonobviousness 
should weed out those inventions for which the inducement of a 
patent is unnecessary. The second answer, a psychological one, 
ties nonobviousness to creativity. In this view, only creative, non-
algorithmic inventions should be granted patent protection. The 
two views are potentially reconcilable if one views the psycholog-
ical perspective as a proxy for economic inducement in a subset of 
cases—a view we advance in Part II. Both of these theoretical  
 
 157 See Davidson and Greenberg, 12 Lewis & Clark L Rev at 530–33 (cited in note 30). 
 158 See, for example, Mandel, 67 Ohio St L J at 1402–03 (cited in note 26) (collecting 
sources that explain how “[t]he hindsight bias has proven remarkably unyielding to varied 
efforts to ameliorate its impact”); Davidson and Greenberg, 12 Lewis & Clark L Rev at 539 
(cited in note 30) (“Hindsight bias is poisonous for the nonobviousness requirement in pa-
tent law. Even though the Supreme Court thinks it sufficient for patent examiners and 
courts simply to be aware of, and cautious about, hindsight bias, research presents a com-
pelling case that this bias is impervious to change.”). 
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approaches have struggled to guide the development of clear doc-
trinal tests that can protect against hindsight bias, while incor-
porating contextual factors—such as surges in market demand—
that would drive innovation without patent protection. 
We take the economic approach as the largely correct concep-
tual interpretation of nonobviousness under a utilitarian frame-
work. The ultimate goal of patent law, as embedded in the  
US Constitution, is a utilitarian one.159 We grant patent protec-
tion because the social benefits derived from such protection out-
weigh the social costs of patents’ limited monopoly. Under this 
framework, the inducement standard in Graham and KSR repre-
sents the clearest articulation of the cost-benefit balance embed-
ded in patent law. When market competition would suffice to 
bring about an invention, granting patent protection to such in-
vention would represent a net cost to society. 
Our theoretical analysis of the nonobviousness requirement, 
which we undertake in the next Part, proposes several important 
refinements to this economic view. First, we note that the market 
forces emphasized by economic views (demand surges and exoge-
nous technological developments) fail to capture important struc-
tural determinants to innovation.160 By identifying innovation-
specific factors that make innovation more or less risky,  
predictable, and costly, our network perspective both comple-
ments and deepens current economic understandings of nonobvi-
ousness. Second, we show how some psychological understand-
ings of creativity that emphasize boundary-crossing can serve as 
useful proxies for economic nonobviousness. Finally, we opera-
tionalize a network view of innovation by creating a network 
measure of nonobviousness (the network nonobviousness score, 
NNOS), which we explain in Part III. We argue that our approach 
represents the best attempt to date to simultaneously reduce 
hindsight bias and incorporate the impact of market and social 
forces into the nonobviousness inquiry. 
  
 
 159 See, for example, Mark A. Lemley, Faith-Based Intellectual Property, 62 UCLA L 
Rev 1328, 1338–44 (2015) (criticizing nonutilitarian approaches to patent law). 
 160 See Pedraza-Fariña, 70 SMU L Rev at 423–24 (cited in note 37) (describing three 
types of structural barriers to innovation: lack of social ties, cognitive distance, and  
different—or clashing—evaluative frames). 
98 The University of Chicago Law Review [87:63 
II.  MODELING INNOVATION AS A SEARCH AND RECOMBINATION 
PROCESS: IMPLICATIONS FOR NONOBVIOUSNESS  
THEORY AND DOCTRINE 
In recent years there has been a growth in research that not 
only attempts to understand the incentives or cognitive processes 
underlying innovation, but that also focuses on the social and 
structural elements most likely to produce socially impactful, 
breakthrough innovation. This line of research focuses on under-
standing and modeling how inventors search and build upon ex-
isting knowledge to generate new ideas. More specifically, schol-
ars have turned to network perspectives to understand how 
different patterns of information recombination and distinct net-
work structures are likely to lead to different qualities of innova-
tion. Although network perspectives on innovation have had a 
wide-ranging influence on our social scientific understanding of 
what brings about high-quality inventions, as of yet neither legal 
scholars nor patent system administrators have integrated this 
valuable knowledge into patent theory and doctrine. 
A. Innovation as Search and Recombination Across 
Information Networks 
Networks can provide powerful insight into how high-impact, 
new ideas are generated. For instance, examining structural 
holes—arising between two areas of a network that are relatively 
well-connected within themselves but poorly connected to one an-
other—can help us identify potential sources of breakthrough 
ideas. Individuals who bridge these structural holes “are at 
higher risk of having good ideas,”161 by virtue of having access to 
more diverse information and “alternative ways of thinking and 
behaving.”162 These actors—“brokers”163 or “boundary-spanners”164 
in the terminology of network analysis—can leverage their access 
to multiple knowledge communities to come up with ideas that 
others see as unusually “creative.”165 
 
 161 Ronald S. Burt, Structural Holes and Good Ideas, 110 Am J Soc 349, 349–50 (2004). 
 162 Id at 375 n 13 (cited in note 161). 
 163 See, for example, Ronald S. Burt, Brokerage and Closure: An Introduction to Social 
Capital 11–18 (Oxford 2005); Lee Fleming and David M. Waguespack, Brokerage, Boundary 
Spanning, and Leadership in Open Innovation Communities, 18 Org Sci 165, 165–66 (2007). 
 164 See generally Fleming and Waguespack, 18 Org Sci at 169–70 (cited in note 163); 
Rob Cross, Chris Ernst, and Bill Pasmore, A Bridge Too Far? How Boundary Spanning Net-
works Drive Organizational Change and Effectiveness, 42 Org Dynamics 81, 81–82 (2013). 
 165 Burt, 110 Am J Soc at 387–88 (cited in note 161). 
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Structural holes are an example of a social network struc-
tural signature that corresponds to the generation of new ideas. 
Related notions such as “weak ties,”166 “boundary spanning,”167 
and “structural folds”168 all demonstrate that joining disparate or 
weakly connected portions of a social network can lead to valuable 
intermingling of information that otherwise would not be recom-
bined. These findings also extrapolate to information networks, 
in which the underlying network represents not social connec-
tions, but rather the connection between units of information, 
such as patents or scientific articles. For instance, research 
demonstrates that when scientists make atypical combinations of 
information inputs, they are more likely to generate high-impact 
science.169 The underlying notion is that by combining rarely com-
bined types of scientific knowledge, researchers are more likely to 
generate ideas that break new scientific ground and open new av-
enues for future research. Related studies, such as those de- 
monstrating that boundary-spanning research is more likely to be 
high impact170 or that rare combinations of information input can 
generate technological breakthroughs,171 show that these findings 
demonstrating the value of information network measures are  
robust. 
These robust findings about the relationship between high-
impact innovation and distant knowledge recombination have led 
innovation theorists to coin a term for this model of innovation: 
the “tension model.”172 It is so-called because of the inherent  
 
 166 See generally Mark S. Granovetter, The Strength of Weak Ties, 78 Am J Soc 1360 
(1973); Morten T. Hansen, The Search-Transfer Problem: The Role of Weak Ties in Sharing 
Knowledge Across Organization Subunits, 44 Admin Sci Q 82 (1999). 
 167 See, for example, Howard Aldrich and Diane Herker, Boundary Spanning Roles 
and Organization Structure, 2 Acad Mgmt Rev 217, 221–22 (1977); Ryan Whalen,  
Boundary Spanning Innovation and the Patent System: Interdisciplinary Challenges for a 
Specialized Examination System, 47 Rsrch Pol 1334, 1340 (2018). 
 168 See, for example, Balázs Vedres and David Stark, Structural Folds: Generative 
Disruption in Overlapping Groups, 115 Am J Soc 1150, 1151–52 (2010); Mathijs de Vaan, 
David Stark, and Balázs Vedres, Game Changer: The Topology of Creativity, 120 Am J Soc 
1144, 1145–47 (2015). 
 169 Brian Uzzi, et al, Atypical Combinations and Scientific Impact, 342 Science 468, 
471 (2013). 
 170 See, for example, Xiaolin Shi, et al, The Impact of Boundary Spanning Scholarly 
Publications and Patents, 4 PLOS ONE 1, 6 (2009) (“We found that among patent inven-
tions . . . those who cite across disciplines tend to garner more citations, indicating that 
cross-fertilization of ideas does often lead to significant impact.”). 
 171 See, for example, Lee Fleming, Recombinant Uncertainty in Technological Search, 
47 Mgmt Sci 117, 130–31 (2001). 
 172 See, for example, Sarah Kaplan and Keyvan Vakili, The Double-Edged Sword of 
Recombination in Breakthrough Innovation, 36 Strategic Mgmt J 1435, 1435–36 (2015); 
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tension between the need for deep domain expertise required to 
identify potentially fruitful problems and lines of inquiry, and the 
need for broad knowledge search, translation, and recombination 
required to produce high-impact innovation.173 Research explor-
ing the tension model of innovation has shown that “distant and 
diverse recombinations are positively associated with economic 
value.”174 Underlying the tension model of innovation is a concep-
tion of innovation as arising from information search and recom-
bination processes that occur within information and social net-
works.175 By understanding that innovators work within 
networks, and information can be thought of in terms of connec-
tions and distances, a network approach to innovation has ena-
bled researchers to more concisely understand what leads to high-
impact innovation and to typify different types of creativity. 
B. Network Distance as a Proxy for Market Failures in 
Innovation 
Modeling innovation as a search and recombination process 
occurring within information and social networks can help clarify 
the nonobviousness doctrine both as a conceptual matter and in 
application. As we summarized in Part I, an economic theory of 
nonobviousness—which we largely adopt—views the goal of the 
nonobviousness doctrine as providing incentives to help overcome 
market failures within the innovation system. Conceptually, a 
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search and recombination model of innovation can help identify 
such instances of market failures, especially those arising from 
the cost and uncertainty of return on investment.176 Both innova-
tion cost and uncertainty can be thought of in network terms. 
The cost and uncertainty of research rises as a function of 
both the search and the recombination processes. The search pro-
cess involves seeking information inputs to use in the production 
of new inventions. In broad terms there are two types of search 
behavior: local search and global search.177 Local search entails 
investment of research resources within the field, and often leads 
to improvement inventions or inventions that, although they may 
break new ground, do so within an existing domain rather than 
by integrating distant knowledge.178 Some drug innovations 
would fit within the local search paradigm, as they begin from 
established theories of medical science and much of the research 
processes involves “searching” through chemical compound alter-
natives in an attempt to find the most effective treatments.179  
On the other hand, global search involves seeking through 
distant information resources and recombining them to generate 
something new.180 For instance, an invention that allows for brain 
wave detection to articulate a prosthetic limb spans many diverse 
knowledge areas including robotics, neurology, and electrical en-
gineering. Global searches tend to be more uncertain, and there-
fore also more costly, than local searches.181 The higher economic 
cost of global searches stems from a number of factors. Most im-
portant among them are, first, the costs of assembling a research 
team with the necessary diverse and deep domain expertise to 
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understand how to search (and find) relevant information, and 
second, the subtler costs of bringing together diverse innovation 
communities with often divergent research priorities, methodo-
logical approaches, and evaluation processes.182 This second set of 
costs is linked to the transaction costs of breaking strong social 
norms within innovator communities that pull researchers into 
path-dependent local searches rather than broader global 
searches.183 
Just as search can increase the uncertainty and cost of gen-
erating new inventions, so too can the recombination aspect of the 
search and recombination process.184 Recombination requires 
translating knowledge across fields and integrating diverse infor-
mation sources.185 As such, all else being equal, the “distance” be-
tween the information recombined increases the cost of the re-
combination (or translation) process.186 This is the case because, 
in most instances, the network distance between technology areas 
correlates with cognitive distance—defined as the cognitive diffi-
culties entailed in bringing two or more sets of information to-
gether.187 For instance, recombining information inputs from the 
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fields of paper manufacturing and cardboard manufacturing in 
general would entail lower recombination costs than recombining 
information from the domain of paper manufacturing with that 
from the domain of nanomaterials. 
In addition to providing improved conceptual clarity about 
the expected cost of innovation, a network approach can also pro-
vide improved clarity about the expected benefit side of the equa-
tion. Those inventions that require extensive global search, or the 
recombination of distant information inputs to bridge large cog-
nitive distances (or both), face increased uncertainty about their 
potential success. Research shows that this sort of research is 
more likely to produce high-impact output, but it is also more 
likely to fail.188 As a consequence, research involving global 
searches and the recombination of distant knowledge tends to be 
simultaneously more uncertain and more socially beneficial 
(when successful) than research involving local searches. 
Considered from an economic perspective, the costs arising 
from search and recombination can lead to market failures when 
the expected private benefit from the invention is lower than its 
expected private cost, even though the expected social benefit 
from the invention exceeds the expected private cost. When this 
is the case, absent efficient patent incentives, inventions will not 
be induced in a timely fashion. A network perspective comple-
ments this economic conceptualization of the nonobviousness doc-
trine by providing greater insight into the nature of the costs and 
benefits incurred during the innovation process. By conceiving of 
innovation as a search and recombination process occurring 
across information and social networks, a network perspective 
can show more clearly how and why innovation costs are likely 
high for some types of inventions (such as those that recombine 
information inputs from distant parts of an information network) 
but not for others (such as those for which locating the inputs re-
quires very low search costs because of their proximity to the 
origin field).189 
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C. Boundary-Crossing Creativity as a Proxy for Market 
Failures in Innovation 
In addition to enriching current economic understandings of 
nonobviousness, taking a network approach to innovation also 
provides insight into psychological perspectives.190 The creativity 
that lies at the heart of a social-psychological understanding of 
nonobviousness is essential in making connections between dis-
parate parts of a network. Indeed, Steve Jobs, one of the most 
influential innovators of his generation, once explained that 
“[c]reativity is just connecting things . . . [to] synthesize new 
things.”191 From a network perspective, inventions that represent 
technological “breakthroughs” tend to make atypical combina-
tions and draw on knowledge areas that are distant from one an-
other.192 Thus, these boundary-crossing inventions represent both 
creative leaps, as they require high levels of creativity to integrate 
distantly related knowledge, as well as areas of potential market 
failures requiring patent incentives. In short, creativity—under-
stood specifically as bridging the cognitive distance between two 
or more knowledge domains—can serve as a strong proxy for  
economic nonobviousness. 
Likewise, the distinction between algorithmic and heuristic 
research approaches that psychologists use to characterize crea-
tive and thus nonobvious innovation can be understood in net-
work terms. Research drawing on inputs that are closely related 
to one another within the network is more likely to benefit from 
algorithmic research approaches. This type of research involving 
local search and recombination is likely to involve well-trodden 
technical areas where routines for answering typical domain 
questions—and thus algorithmic approaches—have evolved. On 
the other hand, research drawing on information inputs that are 
distant from one another is less likely to be amenable to algorith-
mic research approaches; rather, combining distant knowledge 
domains is likely to require novel, nonroutine troubleshooting  
 
the need to screen through large quantities of compounds, together with clinical trials, can 
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 190 See Part I.B. 
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 192 See notes 161–65. 
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approaches. As we argued in the previous Section, research in-
volving global search and recombination is, in economic terms, 
often more uncertain and costlier than that involving local 
searches. The psychological tests of creativity that rely on distin-
guishing heuristic from routine actions can thus serve as proxies 
of economic nonobviousness for boundary-crossing innovations: 
identifying those inventions where bringing together disparate 
technological domains also requires bridging large cognitive dis-
tances. Indeed, it is a psychologist himself who gives us the 
strongest endorsement of the importance of networks for innova-
tion: “The key to understanding innovation,” argues psychologist 
Keith Sawyer, “is to realize that the networks that bring people 
together are more important than the people themselves.”193 
D. Examples of a Network Perspective on Innovation 
To better understand the intuition underlying the network 
perspective on innovation, consider two examples of recent inven-
tions and their underlying recombinations: the home thermostat 
with machine learning features and the mobile phone featuring 
an OLED screen. The first example, a machine learning thermo-
stat, represents a new application of the domain of machine learn-
ing to home thermostats. At the time of the invention of the first 
machine learning thermostat, these two technological areas (ma-
chine learning and thermostat technology) were “distant” 
knowledge domains that had never been recombined before. This 
generated an invention much different from what had come be-
fore, more likely to require the bridging of distant cognitive do-
mains, and therefore more likely to entail high uncertainty and 
cost. The second of these examples represents an improvement in 
mobile phone screen technology, with brighter and more vibrant 
screens. However, the underlying combination of an electronic 
display and mobile phone technology is a typical one. Because 
there is a long tradition of combining screen technologies with 
mobile phones, these two technological areas are “proximate” to 
one another, and their recombination is less likely to involve the 
costly and uncertain bridging of distant cognitive domains. Tak-
ing into account the different innovation dynamics in these two 
inventions, reflected in their different network structures, the 
first invention merits patent protection more than the second. 
Although the network structures underlying these two inventions 
are quite different, the two inventions may appear remarkably 
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similar to a judge or jury assessing nonobviousness: both of them 
are combination inventions, and both types of combination may 
have become quite commonplace by the time of litigation. 
This same notion can be expressed visually. The three net-
works pictured below (Figure 1) demonstrate three different 
structural states. The nodes within these networks remain  
unchanged, but the connections between them increase. In the 
topmost network, we see two areas of knowledge which are well-
connected within themselves, but share no cross-community  
connections—and are thus separated by a structural hole. This 
network structure represents the two knowledge domains (for ex-
ample, machine learning and thermostats) in our first example 
above. In the second network, we see that this structural hole has 
been bridged. Bringing together these disparately connected 
knowledge areas is precisely the sort of behavior that a network 
approach to nonobviousness would seek to motivate. In the final 
network, we see that the formerly distinct communities have be-
come well connected, suggesting that the need to motivate further 
connections is lessened. This final network represents our second 
example, mobile screen technology, illustrating the proximity of 
the two knowledge domains of mobile phones and screens, at the 
time of the improvement. 
This progression from a state in which areas of technical 
knowledge are relatively disconnected to a state in which they 
share many connections helps illustrate the need for the nonobvi-
ousness test to be able to account for changes over time in scien-
tific and technical knowledge and norms. Human knowledge and 
technical capacity are in a constant state of flux. What appears 
nonobvious today may seem strikingly obvious in a few years’ 
time. This temporal aspect of nonobviousness arises in both con-
cerns about hindsight bias and in the notion that the incentives 
set by nonobviousness should seek to motivate the timely creation 
of new ideas.194 Although traditional theoretical understandings 
of nonobviousness acknowledge the importance of change over 
time in performing the obviousness analysis, they provide few an-
alytic tools to help decisionmakers do so. One distinct advantage 
of a network approach to patentability is that it offers the capac-
ity to define analytically useful measures grounded in the empir-
ical history of innovation that can provide insight into how the 
distance between knowledge domains changes over time. In turn, 
a network approach can guide nonobviousness determinations 
 
 194 See Part I.B. 
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based on the network structure at the relevant time for adjudicat-
ing nonobviousness. 
In the next Part, we turn to the measurement problem. We 
demonstrate that the network distance between the information 
combinations underlying new inventions can be used to provide a 
signal as to how likely that invention is to be nonobvious, and 
show that this notoriously vague and problematic area of patent 
law is in fact amenable to empirical analysis.195 
  
 
 195 See Part III. 
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FIGURE 1: Showing three stages of network evolution as two 
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III.  DEVELOPING AND DEMONSTRATING A NETWORK MEASURE OF 
NONOBVIOUSNESS 
In this Part we present an empirical demonstration of how 
historical data on patenting trends can be used to inform doctri-
nal nonobviousness decisions. We first describe empirical net-
work analysis methodology and how it can be used to understand 
patenting and innovation. We then show how technical classifica-
tion combinations can be used to estimate the degree to which a 
given invention brings together proximate or distant areas of 
prior art (or prior knowledge). We validate our measure by com-
paring it against nonobviousness determinations both at the pa-
tent office and in the courts. Finally, we apply our measure to 
existing caselaw, demonstrating that it can be used to provide 
empirical insight into the nonobviousness assessment. 
A. Network Analysis in Legal Research 
Despite their relative novelty in empirical research methods, 
networks are conceptually quite simple. At their core, they repre-
sent relationships between entities. There are two concepts that 
are fundamental to a network—“nodes” (sometimes known as ver-
tices) and “links” (sometimes referred to as edges). Nodes repre-
sent some sort of entity—for instance, a document, person, or  
category—while the links represent how they are related to  
one another—for instance, by citation, friendship relationship, or 
similarity.196 
Importantly for our purposes, links need not represent simple 
binary relationships but can also convey the strength or “weight” 
of that relationship. Links between two nodes that have a high 
weight represent a stronger or “closer” relationship than those 
with a low weight. The example below shows nodes (the circles in 
the diagram) linked together with weighted links (the thickness 
of the link provides a visual representation of its weight). 
 
 196 See Whalen, 2016 Mich St L Rev at 541–42 (cited in note 48). 
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FIGURE 2: Simple network diagram, showing three nodes and 
three links. 
 
 The rise of network analysis as a methodological approach 
has been a key development in physical, biological, and social sci-
ences.197 Recently, scholars have begun applying network analytic 
techniques to legal questions.198 For example, researchers have 
studied the precedent citation network, in which each node rep-
resents a judicial opinion and the links between them represent 
citations.199 Scholars have also studied statutes using a network 
analytic approach, with nodes representing passages and links 
representing references from one portion of a law to another.200 
 
 197 See, for example, Easley and Kleinberg, Networks, Crowds, and Markets at 7–17, 
567–85 (cited in note 49). 
 198 For an overview of the legal network literature see Whalen, 2016 Mich St L Rev 
at 547–54 (cited in note 48). 
 199 See generally, for example, James H. Fowler and Sangick Jeon, The Authority of 
Supreme Court Precedent, 30 Social Networks 16 (2008) (using networks to analyze the 
Supreme Court’s fidelity to stare decisis over time); James H. Fowler, et al, Network  
Analysis and the Law: Measuring the Legal Importance of Precedents at the US Supreme 
Court, 15 Polit Analysis 324 (2007) (constructing a network to determine what Supreme 
Court precedents are most legally relevant at a particular moment in time); Ryan Whalen, 
Modeling Annual Supreme Court Influence: The Role of Citation Practices and Judicial 
Tenure in Determining Precedent Network Growth, in Ronaldo Menezes, Alexandre  
Evsukoff, and Marta C. González, eds, Complex Networks 169, 175 (Springer 2013) (utiliz-
ing networks to show that “precedent stability, citation age, the number of components in 
a year’s citation subgraph and judicial tenure are all significantly related to the number 
of citations a year’s decisions will go on to garner”). 
 200 See generally Daniel Martin Katz and M.J. Bommarito II, Measuring the Com-
plexity of the Law: The United States Code, 22 Artificial Intell L 337 (2014); Marios  
Koniaris, Ioannis Anagnostopoulos, and Yannis Vassiliou, Network Analysis in the Legal 
Domain: A Complex Model for European Union Legal Sources, 6 J Complex Networks  
243 (2018). 
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Others have studied the law school network, with law schools as 
nodes and links representing faculty who have trained at a given 
law school and now work at another.201 
Legal scholars have also begun to use network analytics to 
study the pattern of interactions revealed by patent documents. 
For instance, scholars have explored how networks of patent cita-
tions demonstrate technological diffusion202 and can predict fu-
ture technological developments.203 Others have examined the 
network of inventors linked by their prior collaborations,204 or 
have leveraged co-classification to identify patents that span 
technological boundaries.205 This work, like the broader work on 
networks and the legal system, is descriptive in nature, showing 
trends within the patent citation network and identifying emerg-
ing areas of technology or particularly valuable innovations. Our 
project differs both methodologically and normatively from these 
previous studies. By focusing on the knowledge distance between 
an invention’s inputs, our approach uses network data to provide 
an empirical signal as to how likely a specific invention is to be 
nonobvious.206 By showing how the technological categorization 
co-occurrence network can be used to inform nonobviousness 
analysis, this Article is the first to use network analysis to inform 
doctrinal legal outcomes. 
  
 
 201 See generally Daniel Martin Katz, et al, Reproduction of Hierarchy? A Social  
Network Analysis of the American Law Professoriate, 61 J Legal Educ 76 (2011). 
 202 See generally Shann-Bin Chang, Kuei-Kuei Lai, and Shu-Min Chang, Exploring 
Technology Diffusion and Classification of Business Methods: Using the Patent Citation 
Network, 76 Tech Forecasting and Soc Change 107 (2009). 
 203 See generally, for example, Érdi, et al, 95 Scientometrics 225 (cited in note 51) 
(using a patent citation network to predict the emergence of new technological fields);  
Torrance and West, 20 Va J L & Tech 466 (cited in note 52) (inferring the value of patents 
from their relative importance in a patent citation network); Strandburg, et al, 21 Berkeley 
Tech L J 1293 (cited in note 51) (studying the evolution of the patent citation network to 
assess whether patents were increasingly being granted for trivial improvements). 
 204 See generally, for example, Lee Fleming, Charles King III, and Adam I. Juda, 
Small Worlds and Regional Innovation, 18 Org Sci 938 (2007). 
 205 See generally, for example, Shi, et al, 4 PLOS ONE 1 (cited in note 170). 
 206 Prior work by Professor Shur-Ofry and by one of us (Laura Pedraza-Fariña) also 
theorized on the desirability of using network metrics to inform the nonobviousness in-
quiry—proposing recombination metrics based on backward citations or technological sub-
classifications. Neither Shur-Ofry’s nor our previous work, however, developed a broader 
network theory of innovation or engaged with the detailed development and empirical val-
idation of such a metric. See Shur-Ofry, 51 U Mich J L Ref at 80–84 (cited in note 53); 
Pedraza-Fariña, 70 SMU L Rev at 436–38 (cited in note 37). 
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B. Toward a Network Measure of Nonobviousness: Building 
the Patent Classification Network 
To demonstrate our network measure of nonobviousness, we 
built a network based on the technical classification categories 
used for patent documents.207 To create the patent classification 
network, we downloaded the cooperative patent classification 
(CPC) data for all patents granted since 1836.208 We then assem-
bled a network in which nodes represent CPC subclasses, and the 
weighted links between them represent the number of times 
those subclasses co-occur on the same patents. For instance, if a 
granted patent is categorized as H04Q (switches, relays, and se-
lectors), G06N (computer systems based on specific computa-
tional models), and Y02B (climate change mitigation technolo-
gies) then we would add one to the link weight between each of 
those pairs of classes.209 
Once the network is created we can begin to see the “distance” 
between technical areas. Those areas with strong links co-occur 
frequently and are thus “closer” to one another, whereas those 
areas with weak links or no link at all are more distantly related. 
However, we cannot use the simple link weights as our final dis-
tance measures because they do not control for the frequency of 
individual classifications. Common technical areas—such as 
H01L, a category for semiconductor devices and electric solid-state 
devices—would appear much closer to all other technical areas 
 
 207 When a patent application enters the patent examination system, patent examin-
ers assign each application to one or more technological sections (level 1 in the classifica-
tion hierarchy), classes (level 2), subclasses (level 3), groups (level 4), and subgroups 
(level 5). The vast majority of patents are classified into several subtechnological classes 
reflecting the combinatorial nature of innovation. For an extended explanation of the de-
velopment of the cooperative patent classification (CPC) system, see About CPC  
(Cooperative Patent Classification by the European Patent Office and USPTO), archived 
at https://perma.cc/ESD3-XKW6. The empirical demonstration below uses classification 
data at the subclass level (level 3 in the classification hierarchy). 
 208 Data on US patents are generally available from 1836 onward due to the Patent 
Office fire of 1836, which destroyed the vast majority of previous patent records. Marco, et 
al, The USPTO Historical Patent Data Files at *12 (cited in note 40). We downloaded the 
Cooperative Patent Classification data from the USPTO’s bulk data website. United 
States Patent and Trademark Office, Bulk Data Storage System: Cooperative Patent Clas-
sification (CPC) Master Classification File (MCF) for US Patent Grants, archived at 
https://perma.cc/7832-KZKV (accessed Dec 2017). 
 209 This example is drawn from US Patent No 9,245,229 covering technology related 
to “[o]ccupancy pattern detection, estimation and prediction,” and assigned to Google, Inc. 
The invention couples an occupancy sensor—for detecting the number of people present at 
a location at different points in time—with an algorithm for detecting occupancy patterns 
and predicting future occupancy levels. Anthony Michael Fadell, et al, Occupancy pattern 
detection, estimation and predictions, US Patent No 9,245,229 (filed Jan 26, 2016), ar-
chived at https://perma.cc/BG9Y-5NT2. 
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than their less common peers, simply by virtue of their commonal-
ity. What we are ultimately interested in is how often classifica-
tions co-occur relative to each of their frequencies. 
To address this, we re-weighted the links between the classi-
fication nodes to represent the probability of observing that  
co-occurrence based on its distribution of prior co-occurrences.210 
This leads to a directed network with the directed edge weights 
representing the probability that, given the classification in ques-
tion is listed on a patent, the linked classification will also be 
listed. For instance, using the above example of the Google occu-
pancy pattern detection invention, the probability of the link be-
tween H04Q and G06N co-occurring is 0.000063 when considered 
from the perspective of whether a patent listing H04Q also in-
cludes a G06N classification, and 0.001600 when the question is 
posed in the opposite manner—in other words, whether a patent 
listing G06N also includes a H04Q classification.211 These proba-
bility scores are skewed, with the majority being quite low, sug-
gesting that many granted patents make relatively novel  
combinations.212 
When visualizing a network, probability scores are plotted as 
distance: technological classifications (nodes in our network) that 
are frequently recombined with a large number of other classifi-
cations (and thus are “closer” to a large number of classifications) 
will end up located in a “central” position in the network once all 
the links between technological classifications are drawn. Node 
size corresponds to the total strength of its relationships with 
other nodes, which can be interpreted as how “close” a category is 
to other categories, so larger nodes are closer to more other tech-
nical categories.213 
 
 210 Here, we are transforming the undirected co-occurrence network into a directed 
network—because each CPC class occurs with varying frequency, so the pairwise proba-
bility varies based on class. The initial network is “undirected” because links exist between 
two classes simply if they co-occur. Directionality gets added when we visualize the net-
work based on the probability of each co-occurrence from each node’s perspective. 
 211 These probabilities are calculated using the co-classification network as it existed 
at the end of 2016. They change over time as inventions link together different nodes 
within the network. Data on file with the authors. 
 212 See Hyejin Youn, et al, Invention as a Combinatorial Process: Evidence from US 
Patents, 12 J Royal Society Interface 1, 3–4 (2015). 
 213 To produce this figure, we have removed one CPC subclass (Y10T) that covers 
“Technical Subjects Covered by Former US Classification.” This classification serves as a 
sort of “other” category. 
114 The University of Chicago Law Review [87:63 
Visualizing this network shows that there are a few highly 
central nodes (Figure 3).214 The structure suggests five “commu-
nities” of nodes that share more and stronger links among one 
another than they do with nodes outside of their community.215 
The most central substantive CPC category is H01L, which in-
cludes patents related to semiconductor devices, followed by 
B29C covering inventions related to plastic shaping or joining. 




 214 For a clearer visualization, this network contains only the stronger links from the 
full network. Any links below the 75th weight percentile were trimmed for the purpose of 
visualization. 
 215 Vincent D. Blondel, et al, Fast Unfolding of Communities in Large Networks,  
2008 J Statistical Mechanics 1, 2–6 (explaining the concept of and process to find  
“communities”). 
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We are most interested not in describing the CPC co-occur-
rence network as it is currently structured, but rather in using 
it (and the evolving connections between technological areas) to 
provide insight on how nonobvious a particular invention might 
be. The following Section will do this by using the co-occurrence 
probability distribution to construct a network nonobviousness 
score (NNOS) for each patent, and by applying the NNOS to eval-
uate specific inventions. 
C. Constructing and Validating the Network Nonobviousness 
Score 
Recall that our empirical aim is to develop a measure that 
can classify patents according to the distance between the tech-
nology areas recombined in each patent (or invention). As we ar-
gued in Part II, the distance between technology areas recom-
bined in any given patent can serve as a proxy for economic 
nonobviousness—with patents that recombine distant knowledge 
being more costly, risky, and therefore nonobvious than those 
that recombine local knowledge. To arrive at this empirical meas-
ure—which we term a patent’s “network nonobviousness score,” 
or NNOS—we calculate the probability that a pair of categories 
will be listed together in a patent by comparing each subclassifi-
cation pair against historical categorization co-occurrence pat-
terns. The higher the co-occurrence probability, the closer two 
technology areas are in the knowledge network and vice versa. 
Because most patents have multiple technology subclasses, we 
calculate the co-occurrence probabilities for every single technol-
ogy subclass pair listed in a patent document. We then choose the 
subclass pair with the lowest probability score (in other words, 
the technology pair most distant to each other) as indicative of the 
technological “leap” contained in the patent—this represents the 
NNOS. More specifically, we take the following steps to arrive at 
a NNOS: 
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1. identify all of the invention’s technological 
subclassifications; 
2. calculate the two pairwise probabilities between each 
combination of two categories;216 
3. identify the higher pairwise score (the “conservative 
recombination probability”) for each combination of two 
categories;217 and 
4. identify the pair of technology classes with the lowest 
conservative recombination probability score.218 
This is taken as its NNOS. To enable comparisons across dif-
ferent technical areas, the NNOS can also be converted to a stand-
ardized z-score by comparing the patent’s network nonobvious-
ness score against that of inventions sharing the same primary 
CPC classification. A standardized z-score tells us how far from 
the mean population score a particular network nonobviousness 
score is.219 Positive z-scores represent pairwise combinations that 
are more frequent than the mean nonobviousness score. Negative 
z-scores represent pairwise combinations that are less frequent 
than the mean population nonobviousness score.220 
 
 216 For each subclass pair, there are two possible pairwise probabilities. First, the 
frequency with which, historically, a patent containing subclass (A) also contains sub-
class (B). Second, the frequency with which, historically, a patent containing subclass (B) 
also contains subclass (A). 
 217 This reflects a conservative assumption. By focusing on the higher probability 
score between each pair of categories, this operationalization of a NNOS leads to differing 
obviousness assessments in a case when the distance from categories A to B is significantly 
different than from B to A. Because, from a social welfare perspective, we are interested 
in identifying the probability that any technological community will act as a broker be-
tween two technology areas, we choose the technological community with the highest like-
lihood of making a particular recombination leap as our reference community. 
 218 These probability scores can be interpreted as proximity scores, showing how close 
or proximate technical areas are to one another. If they score highly, they co-occur fre-
quently and have a high probability of being listed on the same patent—that is to say they 
are proximate. If the pairwise score is low, it suggests the two categories co-occur relatively 
infrequently and are thus distant from one another in the CPC network. We choose the 
two technology areas with the lowest conservative recombination probability because it 
represents the greatest “leap” the invention has made between technical areas. 
 219 Using the z-score (rather than the raw NNOS score) to determine nonobviousness 
reflects a second assumption embedded in our algorithm. We posit that the most relevant 
NNOS reflects a comparison between the invention at issue and the average distance rou-
tinely bridged by inventions in the same primary technical field. In fields where global 
search is more entrenched and “routine,” market forces are likely able to induce more dis-
tant searches than in fields where global searches are rare. The latter likely require a 
stronger patent inducement to motivate distant recombinations. 
 220 See Neil J. Salkind, 1 Encyclopedia of Research Design 1662–64 (SAGE 2010). 
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An example can help clarify further how we calculate the 
NNOS. Recall the home thermostat with machine learning fea-
tures we discussed in the Introduction, and in Part II.D. This in-
vention corresponds to US Patent No 9,256,230 claiming a 
“HVAC schedule establishment in an intelligent, network- 
connected thermostat,” and assigned to Google, Inc.221 This patent 
claims interactive methods for scheduling climate control. As 
such, it is classified within a variety of CPC categories including: 
• F24F: “Air-conditioning, air-humidification, ventilation, 
use of air currents for screening” 
• G05D: “Systems for controlling or regulating nonelectric 
variables”; and 
• H04L: “Transmission of digital information, e.g., tele-
graphic communication” 
These three categories give us six pairwise probability scores, 
and thus three conservative recombination probabilities (in bold 
below) as follows: 
• F24F à G05D = 0.03690 
• G05D à F24F = 0.03312 
• F24F à H04L = 0.01116 
• H04L à F24F = 0.00028 
• G05D à H04L = 0.00666 
• H04L à G05D = 0.00019 
  
 
 221 US Patent No 9,256,230 (cited in note 41). 
118 The University of Chicago Law Review [87:63 
FIGURE 4: Showing the subnetwork for the CPC subclasses listed 
on US Patent No 9,256,230.  
Link directionality is clockwise. The “conservative recombina-
tion probability” scores taken as a reference for each pair of tech-
nology areas are as follows: H04L-F24F= 0.01116; H04L-
G05D= 0.00666; F24F-G05D = 0.03690. The NNOS for this in-
vention is 0.00666.222 
 
 
These link weights can be interpreted as showing the proba-
bility that any patent listing the classification in the first column 
will also list the classification in the second column. For instance, 
the first row shows that there’s an almost 4 percent chance that 
a patent listing F24F (air-conditioning technologies) will also list 
G05D (systems for controlling nonelectric variables). That these 
two occur together relatively often is unsurprising, as tempera-
ture is one potential nonelectric variable. On the other hand, we 
see that for every 1,000 patents that lists G05D, fewer than seven 
also list H04L (“transmission of digital information, such as tele-
graphic communication”). This shows how rarely digital infor-
mation transmission had been combined with nonelectric varia-
ble control as of the application’s submission date, suggesting the 
technology claimed is relatively nonobvious. We can see this rep-
resented visually in Figure 4 as the links between F24F and 
G05D bring their respective categories close to one another, while 
 
 222 Data on file with the authors. 
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H04L is only distantly related to either of them.223 Put differently, 
the combination of machine learning features with thermostat 
equipment was, at the time of the invention, an atypical combi-
nation suggesting a nonobvious invention. This example also pro-
vides a good illustration of asymmetry in the two pairwise proba-
bilities between each combination of two categories. Notice how 
the probability that a patent listing H04L also lists G05D 
(0.00019) is an order of magnitude lower than the probability that 
a patent listing G05D also lists H04L (0.00666). To calculate the 
NNOS, we ignore the lowest pairwise probability score (0.00019). 
We can interpret these asymmetric probability scores as showing 
that the community of inventors involved in mechanical air- 
conditioning and ventilation searched globally to inventions within 
the community of digital information transmission more fre-
quently than the reverse. Our algorithmic design choice to ignore 
the lowest pairwise probability score has an impact on doctrinal 
outcomes, as many algorithm design choices often do. We return to 
a discussion on algorithmic decision-making in Part III.E and 
point to areas of further research in our concluding comments. 
Validating the relationship between these scores and nonob-
viousness is not a trivial task. Because inventions lie on a contin-
uum—from most to least creative (under psychological theories) 
or from slightly to extremely delayed without patent protection 
(under economic theories)—where exactly to place the line be-
tween obvious and nonobvious inventions is a policy decision. 
This decision can be guided, but is not completely predetermined, 
by theory.224 However, prior nonobviousness decisions at the  
Patent Office and the courts do provide some signal that we can 
use to demonstrate whether or not our network theory of nonob-
viousness generally accords with prior decision-making.225 
 
 223 The z-score for this patent is −0.48: half a standard deviation below the mean for 
thermostat patents. 
 224 Both proponents of psychological and economic theories recognize that theory 
alone does not provide a precise answer regarding where to locate the nonobviousness 
threshold. See, for example, Abramowicz and Duffy, 120 Yale L J at 1611 (cited in note 4) 
(“‘Ease’ is, of course, a relative term, and that is its strength. The term invites judgment 
about the economic factors that make the process of developing something new more or 
less difficult.”); Meurer and Strandburg, 12 Lewis & Clark L Rev at 573 (cited in note 28) 
(“The choice of nonobviousness threshold to prod potential inventors toward more difficult, 
socially preferable research projects depends on a normative assessment of the value of 
social spillovers that seems highly appropriate for judicial resolution.”); Amabile, 45 J  
Personality & Soc Psychology at 361 (cited in note 151) (“It is assumed that there is a 
continuum of creativity from the lower levels of ‘garden variety’ creativity observed in 
everyday life to historically significant advances in literature, the arts, and science.”). 
 225 Although our theory can offer prescriptive guidance on nonobviousness decisions, 
any useful legal theory must also be able to explain (and not just criticize) the shape of 
120 The University of Chicago Law Review [87:63 
The United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) 
provides insight into what constitutes nonobviousness every time 
it rejects a patent application as obvious. One would expect that, 
at least at the aggregate level, if our network nonobviousness 
measure accurately captures an aspect of nonobviousness, then 
we will see this evidenced in the historical record of patent appli-
cation rejections that are based on § 103 (obviousness) grounds. 
We can test for this by comparing the network nonobviousness 
score of applications that the USPTO rejected on § 103 obvious-
ness grounds against those that are allowed or rejected for other 
reasons. Doing so provides general support for our contention that 
the network theory of nonobviousness provides a signal as to 
which inventions are likely to be obvious.226 For instance, when 
we examine patent applications with low network nonobvious-
ness scores—in other words, those applications we would expect 
to be held nonobvious—we see that § 103 rejections are indeed 
21 percent less frequent than we would expect by chance. Simi-
larly, when we examine those patent applications that have high 
network nonobviousness scores—such as those that we would ex-
pect to be more likely to be found obvious—we see that patent 
examiners are indeed 9 percent more likely to find these applica-
tions obvious than we would expect.227 
We further validate our measure by looking to litigated pa-
tents. To do so, we compare the NNOS of patents that were sub-
jected to nonobviousness analysis by the Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit (CAFC) against a random set of similarly classi-
fied patents. We find that—especially at the margins—the court’s 
 
existing legal opinion. By validating our measure against PTO decisions, we show how our 
theory, in the aggregate, fits PTO’s nonobviousness determinations (even though it can 
also offer a critique of individual decisions). See, for example, Ronald Dworkin, In Praise 
of Theory, 29 Ariz St L J 353, 356 (1997) (explaining the role of theory as finding the “set 
of principles [that] provides the best justification for the general shape of any considerable 
part of the law”). 
 226 To perform this comparison, we use USPTO office action data detailed in Qiang 
Lu, Amanda Myers, and Scott Beliveau, USPTO Patent Prosecution Research Data:  
Unlocking Office Action Traits (USPTO Economic Working Paper No 2017-10, Nov 2017), 
archived at https://perma.cc/T8KB-SVV2. 
 227 These analyses were performed by first taking a random sample of patent appli-
cations, with the sample balanced across three types of PTO office actions: § 101 rejections 
based on unpatentable subject matter, § 103 rejections based on obviousness, and allow-
ances. We then calculate network nonobviousness scores and determine the distribution 
across office action types for the applications in the highest and lowest score deciles. This 
reveals an overrepresentation of § 103 rejections in the high decile. A chi-squared test 
demonstrates that overrepresentation is significantly higher than one would expect by 
chance, χ2 = 10.79, p < 0.01. Similarly, the lowest decile shows an underrepresentation of 
§ 103 rejections than we would expect to observe at random. 
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decisions agree with our predictions based on litigated patents’ 
NNOS. Those litigated patents which had the highest ten scores 
(demonstrating a high probability of observing their class combi-
nations) were all held to be obvious, while those with the lowest 
ten scores (demonstrating a low probability of observing their class 
combinations) were held to be nonobvious seven times out of ten.228 
In the aggregate, our measure agrees both with historical pa-
tent examination and litigation outcomes. However, there will be 
instances of both agreement and disagreement between our 
measure and traditional approaches: these are the important 
cases in which the network theory of nonobviousness and its as-
sociated NNOS can “criticize” existing law and provide useful 
guidance. 
D. Applied Examples of the Network Nonobviousness Score 
In this Section we apply our measure to specific patent dis-
putes, demonstrating how it can help shed light on whether or not 
a given invention should be considered nonobvious. There are four 
possible outcomes when making a determination as to whether or 
not a given invention is nonobvious. One could correctly identify 
it as nonobvious, correctly identify it as obvious, incorrectly iden-
tify it as nonobvious, or incorrectly identify it as obvious.229 That 
is to say, the PTO (or courts) can grant a patent on an invention 
that is indeed patentable (true positive), grant a patent on an in-
vention that is not patentable (false positive), reject an applica-
tion for an invention that is in fact patentable (false negative) or 
reject an application in which an invention is indeed not patent-
able (true negative). 
Table 1 shows these four possible outcomes, and maps them 
onto their classification outcome categories. 
  
 
 228 Data on file with the authors. 
 229 In machine learning parlance, these model outcomes are often conveyed in a con-
fusion matrix that is used for model evaluation. See Kai Ming Ting, Confusion Matrix, in 
Claude Sammut and Geoffrey I. Webb, eds, Encyclopedia of Machine Learning and Data 
Mining 260 (Springer 2d ed 2017). False positives and false negatives are analogously 
referred to as Type I and Type II errors in statistical hypothesis testing. 
122 The University of Chicago Law Review [87:63 
TABLE 1: FOUR POSSIBLE OUTCOMES OF NONOBVIOUSNESS 
ADJUDICATION 
 
 Invention is in 
fact nonobvious  
(patentable)  
Invention is in 
fact obvious  
(not patentable)  




















We apply our NNOS to examples of each of these decision 
outcome types by examining Federal Circuit nonobviousness de-
cisions after KSR. 
1. True negative: Western Union v MoneyGram. 
In the “true negative” category the invention in question is 
obvious, and the decision maker correctly determines it to be so. 
This will lead to either a rejection of the patent application, or an 
invalidation of the patent if it has already been granted. For an 
example of this type of outcome, we can look to the Federal  
Circuit’s decision in Western Union Co v MoneyGram Payment 
Systems, Inc.230 This dispute arrived at the Federal Circuit from 
the Western District of Texas after MoneyGram appealed a jury 
finding of patent validity and infringement. 
Western Union’s invention claimed a method to process 
money transfers without using paper forms. Money transfer cus-
tomers would phone in their order, whereupon the details would 
be entered into a computer database.231 The customer could then 
proceed to a retail money transfer location and, using a code 
phrase associated with her previous phone order, a local customer 
service representative could access the details and accept pay-
ment for the transfer.232 
In litigation, Western Union identified a key technological 
advance that distinguished this claimed method from previous 
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money transfer systems. They argued that the use of a keyboard 
to enter and retrieve order details from an electronic transaction 
fulfillment device (ETFD), as opposed to using a fax machine to 
send details to the retail location, constituted a substantial step 
from the state of the art.233 MoneyGram argued that—given the 
fact that there was prior art from another money transfer fran-
chise detailing a method to phone in an order, and subsequently 
visit a branch that would have been faxed the order details to 
complete the order—the addition of using a keyboard and an  
internet-connected computer to the method would have been ob-
vious to one skilled in the art. Ultimately, the Federal Circuit 
agreed with MoneyGram, finding that “applying computer and in-
ternet technology to replace older electronics has been common-
place” and that using a networked ETFD “was obvious because  
it amounted to no more than applying the use of the Internet  
to existing electronic processes at a time when doing so was  
commonplace.”234 
This analysis is supported by a network approach. Examin-
ing the network nonobviousness score of the most important pa-
tent in question (US Patent No 6,488,203) shows that the inven-
tion draws on highly proximate technology areas—subclasses 
G07F (relating to automated teller machine (ATM) technologies) 
and G06Q (relating to currency transfer and financial technolo-
gies). These two areas have a raw network nonobviousness score 
of 0.53, which demonstrates that they co-occur very frequently, 
almost 2.5 standard deviations higher than the average for finan-
cial transfer technologies.235 This bolsters the court’s findings and 
suggests that it was quite reasonable for the court to suggest that 
an ordinarily skilled artisan would have been likely to combine 
the inputs that the invention draws upon. In a context such as 
that presented in the Western Union case, the NNOS can provide 
valuable empirical insight to identify obvious invention. Indeed, 
the NNOS can increase efficiency and save on litigation costs if 
deployed by the PTO at the examination stage—thus avoiding the 
grant of obvious patents. 
 
 233 Id at 1363, 1368. 
 234 Western Union, 626 F3d at 1370, citing Muniauction Inc v Thompson Corp, 532 
F3d 1318, 1327 (Fed Cir 2008). 
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2. False negative: Nike v Adidas. 
A false negative situation arises when the invention in ques-
tion is not obvious, yet is found to be unpatentable for obviousness 
reasons. To see how this might play out in practice, we can look 
to the dispute in Nike, Inc v Adidas AG.236 In this case, Nike 
owned a patent on a textile-based shoe upper created using a  
knitting process, and commercialized as Nike’s “Flyknit” technol-
ogy.237 The innovation in this type of footwear manufacturing 
technology was the use of yarn and fabric variations, as opposed 
to mesh, to engineer “a featherweight, formfitting, and virtually 
seamless upper,”238 which was also environmentally friendly.239 
According to invention stories in popular media, Nike assembled 
a team of computer scientists, engineers, and designers who took 
“a knitting machine for socks and sweaters and re-engineer[ed] it 
to produce the upper part of a sneaker.”240 
Adidas challenged Nike’s patents in an inter partes review 
proceeding. Nike responded with a request to cancel their existing 
claims and replace them with substitute claims. The Patent Trial 
and Appeals Board (PTAB) rejected Nike’s motion to insert substi-
tute claims, finding that Nike had failed to establish their patent-
ability, and holding the claims obvious.241 On appeal, the Federal 
Circuit agreed with the PTAB’s reasoning that all of the elements 
of the invention were present in three prior art references, and that 
there was a motivation to combine those elements.242 
A network perspective, however, provides evidence that 
Nike’s invention combines distant technology areas. The knitted 
shoe upper invention combines four CPC subclasses, including 
the rarely combined A43D (characteristic features/parts of  
footwear) and D04B (knitting). The raw conservative recombina-
tion probability between these two subclasses is 0.0002, with the 
z-score almost one standard deviation below average, suggesting 
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that previous inventors had rarely combined knitting technolo-
gies with footwear technologies. In turn, the rarity of this recom-
bination provides strong evidence of nonobviousness, especially 
when coupled with publicly available invention stories.243 These 
stories describe the many years of costly research and develop-
ment required to develop the Flyknit manufacturing process—in-
dicating that the large technological distance between knitting 
and footwear also reflects a large cognitive distance between 
these two areas, whose recombination required risky and costly 
team research. 
The PTAB had held that Nike’s invention was simply an  
obvious combination of existing prior art covering both a method 
of producing footwear and of knitting a helmet.244 Nike, however, 
argued that the references were sufficiently different from each 
other that one skilled in the art would not have thought to com-
bine them.245 The low NNOS score supports Nike’s position here. 
The helmet knitting prior art references were both categorized to 
D04B, a technology area that, as we saw above, had rarely been 
combined with footwear inventions. Moreover, both helmet knit-
ting references dated back to 1939.246 This raises the question of 
why they had yet to be combined if indeed there was a motivation 
to combine them with footwear technologies. 
3. False positive: WBIP v Kohler. 
A false positive situation arises when the invention in ques-
tion is in fact obvious, yet it is found to be nonobvious and thus 
patentable. This would be detectable with a NNOS approach 
when a patent has a high NNOS, indicating a highly local search 
and recombination, yet is still held nonobvious.247 
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WBIP, LLC v Kohler Co248 is a representative example. The 
patent at issue covered marine generator carbon monoxide reduc-
tion technology.249 On appeal, Kohler (the infringing party) ar-
gued that, because the invention simply recombined elements al-
ready present in nonmarine engine technology, the invention 
should be considered obvious.250 Because the court was presented 
with conflicting reports of both a presence and absence of a moti-
vation to combine these preexisting elements into the invention 
at issue, it turned to secondary considerations of nonobviousness 
to guide its decision-making. Relying on these considerations,  
including praise for the product and its commercial success,  
the Federal Circuit ultimately rejected Kohler’s obviousness  
argument.251 
This example illustrates one of the greatest challenges in de-
termining nonobviousness, especially for inventions that combine 
a variety of prior art references. An invention that simply recom-
bines known prior art elements is not necessarily obvious. In fact, 
as our search and recombination model of innovation makes clear, 
most inventions can be thought of as the recombination and rear-
rangement of preexisting knowledge elements. Under an eco-
nomic approach, the difference between an obvious and a nonob-
vious recombination is that the former would have taken place 
without patent incentives, while the latter requires the induce-
ment of a patent. Currently, courts rely on a variety of subjective 
and unclear tests to determine whether a combination invention 
such as that at issue in the WBIP case requires the inducement 
of a patent. This evidence includes a number of secondary consid-
erations, such as evidence of commercial success and praise from 
others that were pivotal in the court’s nonobviousness determina-
tion in this case. The NNOS can supplement these tests with em-
pirical evidence. More specifically, the NNOS can provide crucial 
insight into whether the invention recombined distant knowledge 
elements (a type of recombination more likely to be risky and 
costly, and therefore more likely nonobvious) or local knowledge 
elements (a type of recombination more likely to be routine and 
cheap, and therefore more likely obvious). 
Examining the patent at issue in the WBIP case shows a  
relatively high NNOS, suggesting that the prior art areas were in 
fact proximate—approximately half a standard deviation closer 
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than the average invention.252 Although this score alone does not 
conclusively demonstrate that the invention did not require the 
inducement of a patent (and therefore was obvious), it does sug-
gest that an ordinary artisan would have had easy access to the 
prior art ultimately combined to make up the invention. Absent 
additional persuasive evidence of a high cost of recombination 
(driven, for example, by hidden technological difficulties in recom-
bining the proximate preexisting technology), the high NNOS 
should tip the scales toward a finding of obviousness. 
4. True positive: InTouch v VGo. 
A “true positive” nonobviousness determination arises when 
an invention is in fact not obvious and the relevant decision maker 
correctly reaches this conclusion. We can see an example of this 
scenario in InTouch Technologies, Inc v VGo Communications, 
Inc.253 This case arose after InTouch sued VGo for infringing one 
of its patents covering remote telepresence robot technologies. 
The invention in question was designed to allow for remote  
“visits” to a hospital patient, with the telepresence robot  
controlled by a remote device such as a tablet computer.254 
VGo argued that InTouch’s patent was invalid as obvious, 
claiming that it was based on an obvious recombination of pre-
existing inventions.255 At the lower court, the jury had accepted 
VGo’s expert testimony concerning obviousness and had invali-
dated a number of InTouch’s patent claims as obvious combina-
tions of existing prior art.256 However, on appeal, the Federal  
Circuit found that VGo’s expert’s testimony was flawed and  
exhibited hindsight bias.257 Rather than analyzing “what one of 
skill in the art would have understood as of 2001,” VGo’s expert 
had “simply opined what a skilled artisan could accomplish in 
2011.”258 The Federal Circuit held that this hindsight bias,  
combined with the lack of import given to the objective indicia of 
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obviousness that InTouch provided, to merit overruling the jury’s 
finding of obviousness.259 
Our NNOS can act as a decision-making aide in cases such 
as this. Because our score is calculated using the data available 
at the time an invention is created, it is not susceptible to hind-
sight bias.260 Rather, it provides an objective and empirical assess-
ment of how likely a given combination is, based on the contem-
porary evidence available in the patent record. Calculating the 
NNOS on one of the key patents in question261 in the InTouch case 
supports this position. Doing so shows a score more than a full 
standard deviation below the average network nonobviousness 
score (z = −1.23) for telemedicine patents, demonstrating that the 
invention in question brought together technical areas that were 
comparatively rarely combined. This supports the Federal Cir-
cuit’s reasoning in this case and suggests that this was indeed a 
nonobvious invention. 
* * * 
Thus far, this Part has used historical CPC co-classification 
data to develop a network measure of nonobviousness. We then 
validated this approach by comparing its results to USPTO pa-
tent prosecution data and recent Federal Circuit decisions. Fi-
nally, we applied our network nonobviousness score to four actual 
patent disputes and showed how the measure can help guide  
decision-making by identifying likely true positive, false positive, 
true negative, and true positive decisions. The next Section  
explores how to more precisely integrate a network approach to  
nonobviousness into the current doctrinal framework for patent 
nonobviousness. 
E. Integrating the Network Nonobviousness Score into the 
Current Doctrinal Framework 
Modeling innovation as a search and recombination process 
reveals two distinct types of inventions: (1) those emerging from 
local search and recombination processes and (2) those emerging 
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from global search and recombination processes. As we discussed 
in detail in Part II, local searches—all things being equal—tend 
to be more predictable and less costly than global searches. Local 
searches are also likely to lead to incremental improvements of 
existing technology rather than technological leaps. The NNOS 
provides an empirical tool to differentiate the first (local) from the 
second (global) type of inventions. Were we to design a doctrinal 
framework for nonobviousness from the ground up, we would fo-
cus first on identifying whether the invention at issue is the result 
of a local or a global search and recombination. Or, to be more 
precise, we would want to know where the invention at issue falls 
on the spectrum of searches ranging from extremely local to ex-
tremely global—when compared to a “typical” invention in the in-
vention’s primary technological field. Our empirical measure, the 
NNOS, provides precisely this type of signal: when expressed as 
a z-score, it classifies inventions according to whether they recom-
bine knowledge inputs that are more or less distant than the av-
erage or typical invention in a particular technology class. The 
concepts of local and global search, however, can also be inte-
grated into the current doctrinal framework as developed by the 
Court in Graham and KSR. 
The nonobviousness framework consists of four structured 
steps. First, the court must determine the “scope and content of 
the prior art.”262 Prior art relevant for nonobviousness purposes 
comprises the collection of all publicly available knowledge that 
an ordinary artisan (or PHOSITA) would rationally consult when 
attempting to carry out her invention.263 This relevant or “analo-
gous” prior art will therefore exclude some types of existing 
knowledge that are not within the grasp of an ordinary artisan. 
The second step in the nonobviousness inquiry requires identify-
ing the PHOSITA from whose perspective the differences between 
this analogous prior art and the claimed invention must be eval-
uated.264 Both the analogous art and the PHOSITA inquiries can 
be reconceptualized in network terms. In essence, they seek to 
identify the types of knowledge that are proximate (in a network 
sense) to a PHOSITA’s core technological expertise. The key and 
often most complex third step requires a determination of 
whether these differences between the invention and prior art are 
“obvious” from a PHOSITA’s perspective. Finally, step four  
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requires consideration of those “secondary” considerations of  
nonobviousness, if present, first announced by the Court in  
Graham.265 
As we argued in Parts I and II, we adopt an economic inter-
pretation of nonobviousness, which emerges as the best interpre-
tation of the Court’s opinions in Graham and KSR. The Court in 
KSR, however, left unclear how judges should attempt to measure 
existing market and design forces, and when market forces may 
be sufficient to tip the balance toward obviousness. Within this 
economic framework, as we elaborated in Part II, the distance 
traveled by an invention in recombining knowledge inputs serves 
as a proxy for nonobviousness. We propose that the NNOS should 
serve as a threshold “sorting” mechanism, both at the PTO and 
during litigation, that allows for more focused analysis of these 
two distinct types of innovation (local and global). Below, we  
explore in more detail how to incorporate the NNOS, and a net-
work analysis more broadly, into the structured nonobviousness  
inquiry. 
1. The “scope and content of the prior art”: NNOS as a 
threshold sorting mechanism. 
The Federal Circuit uses two criteria to determine whether 
prior art is analogous: “(1) whether the art is from the same field 
of endeavor, regardless of the problem addressed and, (2) if the 
reference is not within the field of the inventor’s endeavor, 
whether the reference still is reasonably pertinent to the particu-
lar problem with which the inventor is involved.”266 Both criteria 
present difficulties for the fact finder. First, technological “fields 
of endeavor” are not fixed over time: disciplines and subdisci-
plines both merge and subdivide over time. Second, whether a 
PHOSITA would consult a particular reference outside her field 
of endeavor is, at bottom, a network inquiry. It can be rephrased 
as: Does a PHOSITA have reasonable access to the network of 
knowledge and expertise to which the outside reference pertains? 
Absent a snapshot of the network of interactions among the rele-
vant technological fields, fact finders applying their “common 
sense” have little objective data to guide their conclusions, which 
in turn risks the introduction of hindsight bias.267 
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Our proposed NNOS relies on the “proximity” of technical 
fields to estimate how likely a combination of those fields is. A 
similar approach can be used to inform the determination as to 
what is, and what is not, the “same field.” By measuring the fre-
quency of recombination between the technical classifications of 
both a given prior art reference and patent, our measure provides 
empirically grounded insight into whether the prior art reference 
and the invention at issue are likely part of the same field. Our 
measure has a singular advantage over current ad hoc methods:268 
it is dynamic and can capture changes in fields and subfields over 
time, while providing a snapshot of the connections among tech-
nical areas at the relevant time for assessing nonobviousness. 
Similarly, our measure can help determine whether a prior 
art reference is reasonably pertinent to an invention’s creation. 
The current test for pertinence is whether a prior art reference 
“logically would have commended itself to an inventor’s attention 
in considering his problem.”269 This test provides little guidance 
to a decision-maker, as it is as difficult to determine what would 
have logically commended itself to an inventor as it is to deter-
mine what was pertinent. However, from a network perspective, 
the inquiry here is fundamentally one of proximity. It can be re-
phrased as: Does a PHOSITA have reasonable access—or is her 
technological field reasonably proximate—to the network of 
knowledge and expertise to which a particular prior art reference 
pertains? Those prior art references that are “close” enough to the 
area within which the inventor is working are pertinent, because 
an inventor will have sufficient access to them. 
Ultimately, however, our network theory upends the bright-
line categories of “analogous” and “non-analogous” art, and 
“same” or “different” field. These categories implicate a classifica-
tion into well-defined buckets. Technological areas, however, are 
not so neatly defined. Rather, a network map reveals a continuum 
of connections among them ranging from more to less proximate. 
Instead of thinking of prior art as “analogous” and “non- 
analogous,” a more productive approach is to divide inventions 
themselves into those arising from local searches and recombina-
tions, and those arising from global searches and recombinations. 
The NNOS can serve as a rough sorting mechanism, with high 
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scores representing frequently recombined local searches and low 
scores representing infrequently recombined global searches. 
This initial sorting inquiry can then guide further analysis ac-
cording to innovation type—as opposed to simply eliminating 
“non-analogous” art from consideration, as is the current practice. 
a) Global search and recombination patents.  Very distant 
searches and recombinations, with very low (in other words, neg-
ative) NNOS z-scores that are more than a full standard deviation 
below the mean score for that technological field, should consti-
tute strong evidence of nonobviousness. This presumption of non-
obviousness, however, can be rebutted if the large technological 
distances bridged by the invention do not correlate well with  
cognitive distance, or if such cognitive distance is already rapidly 
shrinking because of market demands and other social forces.  
Evidence tending to show a disparity between technological and 
cognitive distance would include, for example, the existence of 
routine, readily available scripts or techniques to recombine the 
two distant fields. Network analysis can also detect whether two 
distant technological fields are, in fact, already converging toward 
each other prior to the invention. This can be done by observing 
the network distance between fields over time. Rapid convergence 
can be catalyzed by sudden upticks in market demand for a  
particular type of innovation, or the application of technological 
advances from a third community to bridge existing cognitive dis-
tances. The advantage of a network approach is that the effect of 
these market demands and exogenous technological advances can 
be clearly visualized as two fields rapidly converging toward each 
other prior to the invention at issue. The bar for nonobviousness 
on a combination invention drawing on rapidly converging fields 
should be set somewhat higher, because there is a decreased need 
to incentivize those inventions through patent grants. 
Inventions that recombine “somewhat” distant fields (less 
than a standard deviation away from the mean invention) present 
a more complicated scenario. Here, the NNOS as currently de-
signed provides a weaker signal of nonobviousness. Other objec-
tive indicia of nonobviousness, such as failure of others to develop 
the invention and skepticism from core members of the innovator 
community, should serve as additional evidence that the recom-
bination at issue was risky and that it bridged cognitively distant 
areas. In addition, there are other potential ways of operational-
izing a search and recombination model of innovation. One of 
them includes accounting for recombination complexity by meas-
uring the number of different CPC classes combined in a single 
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invention. In the next Section, we briefly discuss alternative ways 
of calculating the NNOS, which could all be used in concert to 
provide a more accurate network measure of nonobviousness. 
b) Local search and recombination patents.  Very local 
search and recombinations, with NNOS z-scores that are more 
than a full standard deviation above the mean score for that tech-
nological field, should raise a red flag at the patent examination 
stage and during litigation. Inventions with high NNOS scores 
are often those low-risk, low-cost, routine inventions that do not 
require the inducement of a patent. Note that among litigated pa-
tents before the Federal Circuit for which nonobviousness was at 
issue, a very high NNOS almost always corresponded with inval-
idation of the patent at issue.270 At the examination stage, tagging 
this type of patent for careful investigation may reduce the grant 
of low-quality patents and save on wasteful litigation. 
Nevertheless, there are factors other than search and recom-
bination distance that can influence how costly and risky an in-
vention is. More specifically, some inventions arising from closely 
related technological fields require the generation of new 
knowledge available only through lengthy and costly experimen-
tation. There is a key difference between low-cost/low-risk local 
searches and recombinations and their high-cost/high-risk coun-
terparts. In the first category are inventions that simply combine 
easily searchable and recombinable preexisting knowledge ele-
ments like pieces of a puzzle. A good example is the invention at 
issue in Western Union (our “true negative” example). This inven-
tion drew upon extremely proximate areas of knowledge, almost 
2.5 standard deviations higher than the average for financial 
transfer technologies.271 And the specific feature that differenti-
ated this invention from similar ones—the use of a keyboard to 
process transactions—requires no major research and develop-
ment investiture to implement. In the second category, preexist-
ing knowledge elements provide only a starting point for inten-
sive research. A good example of this type of innovation is the 
search for new chemical entities to treat a particular disease. 
Available knowledge usually provides only “clues” as to the type 
of chemical structure that may in fact provide an effective treat-
ment. Finding that chemical structure requires costly (if some-
times routine) research that often requires the inducement of a 
patent. 
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The NNOS is not a magic bullet. It does not provide a number 
that instantly tells the fact finder whether to grant or deny a pa-
tent. Together with the search and recombination theory of inno-
vation on which it is based, however, the NNOS provides objective 
signposts to guide the types of innovation-specific questions ex-
aminers and judges should ask when determining nonobvious-
ness. These signposts are strongest for very low NNOS scores rep-
resenting global searches and recombinations: here the NNOS, 
standing alone, can be a good proxy for nonobviousness. The 
NNOS is also useful to weed out simple combination inventions 
that rely on very proximate knowledge, as was the case in Western 
Union. The case for using the NNOS as a proxy is weakest, how-
ever, when the NNOS is close to the average for a particular tech-
nological area, revealing “somewhat” distant or “somewhat” prox-
imate recombinations of technological knowledge. In these latter 
cases, fact finders should rely more heavily on additional network 
measures, which we discuss in the next Section, or on other  
“secondary considerations of nonobviousness,” to which we turn 
to below in Part III.E.3. 
2. Defining the level of skill in the art. 
Defining the skill level and knowledge content of a PHOSITA 
is a crucial step, not only in the nonobviousness inquiry, but also 
in infringement determinations.272 A PHOSITA is a “typical” in-
ventor, part of the invention’s primary field community. A 
PHOSITA’s ability to creatively bring together distant knowledge 
domains is determined, at least in part, by the baseline recombi-
nation distance typical of that particular field, a feature that can 
be accurately captured by the NNOS expressed as a z-score.  
Because a standardized z-score tells us how far from the mean 
population score a particular network nonobviousness score is, 
each score takes into account the baseline level of “creativity” of 
a particular technological community. 
While the NNOS centers on mapping relationships between 
technological units, the knowledge content of a PHOSITA may 
also be determined by building a network of inventors. Mapping 
relationships between inventors—for instance by linking together 
those who collaborate or work on highly similar inventions—can 
generate an innovation social network that provides insight into 
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the traits of an “ordinary” inventor within a given technical field. 
An inventor social network would allow those tasked with defin-
ing a PHOSITA to canvass a technical “neighborhood” and deter-
mine the average skills, training, and expertise of those working 
in the area.273 
Finally, what constitutes an invention’s “primary” field poses 
a series of interesting questions, linked to defining the commu-
nity to which the PHOSITA belongs. The PTO routinely assigns 
inventions to a “primary” CPC classification category, and we 
take this category as an invention’s primary field for the purpose 
of calculating an invention’s NNOS as a z-score.274 Nevertheless, 
for inventions that bridge together two (or more) separate tech-
nologies, it is unclear at the outset which field among them should 
be chosen as the “primary” field. Should it be the field (or technol-
ogy area) in which the invention at issue has, in fact, originated? 
Should it be the field with the highest pairwise recombination 
probability—in other words, the field most likely to make the re-
combination giving rise to the invention based on the NNOS? 
Should the test instead be based on the market for products em-
bodying the invention? Or should the relevant unit of analysis be 
a team having ordinary skill in the art that has expertise in both 
areas? These questions are undertheorized and underresearched 
in the legal literature. A network approach makes these issues 
salient, generating important questions for further research con-
cerning how to precisely define the relevant innovation commu-
nity in which the PHOSITA resides. 
3. Secondary considerations of nonobviousness. 
The aftermath of KSR has seen a rise in fact finders’ reliance 
on those “secondary” considerations of nonobviousness first artic-
ulated by the Court in Graham.275 This development flows logi-
cally from KSR’s flexible, expansive approach that insists on tak-
ing into account the real-world context of innovation but provides 
limited guidance on how to do so. Secondary considerations of 
 
 273 See MPEP § 2141.03. Constructing such a network is beyond the scope of this  
paper, but we use it here as an illustration of the capabilities of a general network ap-
proach to innovation. 
 274 For a description of how the PTO chooses the “field of invention,” and the crucial 
importance of this choice to multiple patent law doctrines, see generally Saurabh  
Vishnubhakat, The Field of Invention, 45 Hofstra L Rev 899 (2017). 
 275 See Natalie A. Thomas, Secondary Considerations in Nonobviousness Analysis: 
The Use of Objective Indicia Following KSR v. Teleflex, 86 NYU L Rev 2070, 2090, 2094–
95 (2011). 
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nonobviousness naturally anchor the nonobviousness inquiry to 
empirical real-world events.276 
Many secondary considerations can be understood in network 
terms. Specifically, considerations such as “failure of others,” 
“long felt but unmet need (for the invention),” “teaching away 
(from the invention),” and “skepticism” provide relevant evidence 
for understanding the technological and cognitive complexity in-
volved in the search and recombination process. For example, ev-
idence of “skepticism” or “teaching away” can serve as additional 
compelling evidence that market or social forces would have dis-
suaded a particular community from making the particular 
knowledge recombination leading to the invention—making that 
path riskier. “Failure of others” and “long felt but unmet need” 
provides additional evidence that the recombination at issue was 
cognitively complex. As we emphasized in Part II, bridging large 
cognitive distances between knowledge domains requires assem-
bling and managing a team of diverse expertise—a proposition 
that is often both risky and costly and that therefore increases an 
invention’s economic nonobviousness. In our proposed framework 
that begins by categorizing inventions as arising from local or 
global search and recombination processes, these secondary con-
siderations still play an important supporting role—supplement-
ing the initial signal provided by the NNOS. 
Our measure could also be integrated into the current doctri-
nal framework as a secondary consideration itself. The objective 
nature of our proposed measure, tied to the distance between 
technological classes at the time of invention, makes it particu-
larly well suited as a strong secondary consideration. While many 
may disagree about the extent to which a market demand was 
“long-felt but unmet” or how much of its success a successful prod-
uct owes to a patented component, our measure leaves little room 
for contested interpretation.277 We advance this possibility as a 
“second-best” approach to our preferred policy proposal that 
would use the NNOS as a sorting mechanism at the outset of the 
nonobviousness inquiry. 
 
 276 In Graham the Court stated that the “secondary considerations . . . might be uti-
lized to give light to the circumstances surrounding the origin of the subject matter sought 
to be patented.” Graham, 383 US at 17–18. 
 277 Of course, what ultimate legal conclusions on patentability to draw from a partic-
ular network nonobviousness score is open to contextual judicial interpretation since no 
objective measure can provide a single definitive answer to nonobviousness. This is the 
case in large part because determining the threshold level of innovativeness required to 
obtain a patent is a policy decision that cannot be conclusively answered with our network-
based algorithm (or any other existing test). 
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F. Advantages and Limitations of a Network Approach 
The method described above to calculate a NNOS is only one 
of many possible ways to take a network approach toward opera-
tionalizing the concept of nonobviousness. We offer it here as a 
conceptually straightforward demonstration of how thinking of 
innovation as occurring within networks of information can help 
provide insight into how obvious or not a given invention is. In 
practice, the algorithmic design choices underlying a network 
nonobviousness score must address a variety of challenges, in-
cluding asymmetrical distances between fields, differing levels of 
complexity between inventions, and inventions that largely occur 
within a single domain. We briefly touched upon these design 
choices in Part III.C and we expand upon them below. 
The issue of asymmetrical distance occurs when the apparent 
network distance between two categories varies greatly depend-
ing on directionality.278 This can occur when inventions listing  
category A frequently list category B, but those inventions listing 
category B list category A with less relative frequency. In our pro-
posed method above, we have dealt with this issue by opting to 
take what we call the “conservative recombination distance.” This 
essentially ignores the lowest recombination probability between 
the pair and opts instead to select the higher, more proximate of 
the two scores. As such, it sets a higher network nonobviousness 
bar. There are alternate methods of dealing with asymmetrical 
distance, such as averaging the two scores or taking the minimum 
or maximum. Each choice has implications for how network  
nonobviousness is determined, and thus on the patentability  
assessment. 
Differing levels of complexity—defined here as the number of 
different technology areas an invention draws upon—also raise 
questions that should be addressed when designing an appropri-
ate network nonobviousness measure. Those inventions that 
draw largely on a single domain of knowledge and demonstrate 
limited evidence of recombination are less well suited for a non-
obviousness assessment from a network perspective. There are 
certainly inventions that draw primarily on a single knowledge 
domain that an efficient patent system should consider nonobvi-
ous despite the fact that they do not integrate distant knowledge. 
For instance, many drug developments likely fit within this cate-
gory. They may be categorized into only one or a few highly prox-
imate areas, but should nonetheless not be automatically barred 
 
 278 See Part III.E.1. 
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from patentability because of this. As we explained in Part III.E, 
in such cases of very local searches, the NNOS alone cannot an-
swer the nonobviousness question. Rather, fact finders will need 
to rely upon additional factors, such as whether the invention re-
quired the generation of new knowledge available only through 
lengthy and costly experimentation. 
In addition to challenges raised by low-complexity inven-
tions, the variation in degrees of complexity between inventions 
can also raise nonobviousness measurement issues. For instance, 
if relying only on the minimum nonobviousness score between 
any two categories to characterize an invention’s nonobviousness, 
an invention integrating only categories A and B may score the 
same when compared to a second invention integrating both A 
and B as well as many other categories. From an innovation the-
ory perspective, it seems likely that the second invention recom-
bining many more categories is more cognitively and technically 
complex and therefore less obvious. Thus, a fine-tuned empirical 
measure of nonobviousness should be designed to account for 
these varying degrees of complexity. This could be done in a vari-
ety of ways, most of which would supplement the univariate ex-
ample measure defined above with more dimensions of nonobvi-
ousness, such as the total number of categories integrated or the 
sum of the total distance between integrated categories. 
There are multiple other potential nonobviousness signals 
that a “production ready” network measure could leverage. For 
instance, citation relationships between patents can be used to 
infer which preceding technologies the invention in question 
draws upon. In perhaps its simplest form, a citation dimension 
could be added to the NNOS by examining the technical classifi-
cations of the cited prior art—assessing nonobviousness based on 
the distance between the cited prior art fields. Alternatively, ci-
tations can be used to generate a citation network. In a citation 
network, the documents—in this case cited prior art references—
form the nodes, and the citations between them form the links. 
Those inventions that cite to distant prior art references combine 
technical information that is highly dissimilar, suggesting that 
the underlying invention is nonobvious in much the same way 
that combining rarely combined CPC classes does. 
In addition to the technological classification distance, one 
could also incorporate a measure of the “semantic distance” be-
tween the claimed invention and the prior art. By semantic dis-
tance we mean the similarity of the meaning of the language used 
to describe the invention and detail its claims with the language 
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used in prior art documents.279 In conjunction with other data, 
such as patent prior art citation data,280 semantic distance can 
provide insight into the different areas of knowledge that an in-
vention combines.281 This in turn can provide useful insight into 
how likely—and thus obvious—we expect such a combination to 
be.282 Adding a semantic component to our network nonobvious-
ness score could help strengthen the signal, while also making it 
more difficult to “game” the measure by strategically assigning 
technical classifications. Semantic measures also provide a more 
nuanced measure that is less subject to the inherent coarseness 
of metadata measures that treat all content within a given cate-
gory as semantically identical.283 
Finally, a network nonobviousness score could take into ac-
count the source of the knowledge recombined in an invention by 
examining networks of inventors.284 Modern innovation is increas-
ingly produced by teams of researchers,285 and those teams are 
increasingly likely to bring together diverse sets of knowledge.286 
In much the same way as we examine the recombination fre-
quency of technical classifications to provide insight into nonob-
viousness, the social structure of collaboration can reveal the like-
lihood of a particular combination of expertise and experience. 
Unusual collaborations, much like rare technical combinations in 
our NNOS, are more likely to involve the type of risky and costly 
 
 279 Semantic similarity can be measured using a variety of natural language pro-
cessing (NLP) methods. See generally Peter D. Turney and Patrick Pantel, From  
Frequency to Meaning: Vector Space Models of Semantics, 37 J Artificial Intell Rsrch  
141 (2010). 
 280 See, for example, Strandburg, et al, 21 Berkeley Tech L J at 1344 (cited in note 51) 
(proposing that “[p]ath length measures [that rely on citation distance] may provide a 
more fine-grained (and complementary) measure of technological closeness than metrics 
that use the number of overlapping subclasses in the USPTO classification system”). 
 281 See, for example, Whalen, 47 Rsrch Pol at 1341–42 (cited in note 167). 
 282 Others have used semantic measures for similar applications such as detecting 
patent infringement. See generally Hyunseok Park, Janghyeok Yoon, and Kwangsoo Kim, 
Identifying Patent Infringement Using SAO Based Semantic Technological Similarities, 
90 Scientometrics 515 (2011). 
 283 Whalen, 47 Rsrch Pol at 1337 (cited in note 167). 
 284 Doing so would entail mapping the social network of inventor collaborations, 
wherein inventors are connected to one another if they have previously collaborated. With 
the network mapped, one could calculate the likelihood of observing particular types of 
links, or the distance collapsed by adding new collaboration links. 
 285 See Stefan Wuchty, Benjamin F. Jones, and Brian Uzzi, The Increasing Domi-
nance of Teams in Production of Knowledge, 316 Science 1036, 1037 (2007) (finding that 
teams have increasingly produced the most cited scholarship and patents). 
 286 Alan L. Porter and Ismael Rafols, Is Science Becoming More Interdisciplinary? 
Measuring and Mapping Six Research Fields over Time, 81 Scientometrics 719,  
740–41 (2009). 
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recombination of distant cognitive domains that requires the in-
ducement of a patent. 
Regardless of which dimensions an empirical nonobviousness 
measure takes into account—whether it be co-classification data, 
citation data, social network data, or other signals—policymakers 
must remain cognizant of the potential for patent applicants to 
game the system. Like many legal questions, the question of non-
obviousness can be considered from the perspective of rules ver-
sus standards.287 Laws exist not within a dichotomous regime, but 
rather occupy a point somewhere along a rules-to-standards spec-
trum.288 Our proposal for a data-driven NNOS would nudge the 
nonobviousness inquiry in the “rule” direction from its current 
point toward the “standard” side of the spectrum. By making the 
law of nonobviousness more explicit and thus rule like, such an 
approach would also make it somewhat easier for applicants to 
game the system by attempting to ensure that their patent appli-
cations performed well in network nonobviousness terms. For ex-
ample, applicants may intentionally draft their applications in 
such a way as to accentuate their suitability for multiple distant 
categories.289 Although the potential for gaming will likely in-
crease under any quantifiable nonobviousness test, that should 
not alone preclude policymakers from considering its adoption. 
Rather, those using a tool like the NNOS approach must be made 
aware of the potential for gaming; they should be flexible in ap-
plying the score to the patentability assessments; and they should 
not use such an approach uncritically. Importantly, relying on 
multiple network measures of nonobviousness, such as the ones 
outlined above, should significantly reduce the ability of patent-
ees to game the system, as it becomes increasingly harder to game 
multiple different measures simultaneously. 
 
 287 See generally, for example, Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law 
Adjudication, 89 Harv L Rev 1685 (1976) (describing the evolution of rules to standards 
in contract law); Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 – Foreword: The Justices 
of Rules and Standards, 106 Harv L Rev 22 (1992) (discussing the Supreme Court justices’ 
preferences for rules versus standards). 
 288 Russell B. Korobkin, Behavioral Analysis and Legal Form: Rules vs. Standards 
Revisited, 79 Or L Rev 23, 30 (2000) (“The legal forms of rules and standards, then, are 
better understood as spanning a spectrum rather than as being dichotomous variables.”). 
 289 Gaming the system by intentionally drafting patent applications so that the  
invention falls under two distant categories, however, is not without risks for the patentee. 
For example, ensuring an application falls within a category outside the invention’s main 
classification may require adding language reflecting additional technology (a “limitation” 
in the language of patent drafting) that may subsequently narrow the scope of the claim 
and make it easier for others to design around the patent, especially if such limitation is 
not essential to the invention at issue. 
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CONCLUSION 
The nonobviousness doctrine enjoys a dubious place of honor 
in the patent law canon as at once the most important and the 
most vague of all patent law doctrines. This Article has explored 
how a network perspective on patentability, grounded in a search 
and recombination model of innovation, can both clarify the doc-
trine’s theoretical foundations and provide an objective empirical 
measure of nonobviousness. 
This Article made three key contributions. First, it identified 
and then supplied an important missing piece in both psycholog-
ical and economic analyses of patentability: an underlying theory 
of innovation. Building upon network studies of innovation, we 
argued that conceptualizing innovation as a search and recombi-
nation process across knowledge networks provides important  
innovation-specific insights that can improve upon current  
economic and psychological understandings of patentability.  
Under a search and recombination model, firms invent by carry-
ing out either local or global searches and recombinations of ex-
isting knowledge. Because global searches and recombinations re-
quire teams of diverse expertise to bring together cognitively 
distant knowledge domains, they tend to be riskier and more 
costly than local searches, which often rely on well-trodden rou-
tines to recombine easily accessible knowledge. From this per-
spective, we argued that the nonobviousness doctrine should seek 
to incentivize those costly and risky inventions that bring to-
gether cognitively distant technological domains. 
This network perspective nuances current economic under-
standings of nonobviousness by providing innovation-specific fac-
tors (namely, search and recombination distances) that deeply in-
fluence economic risk and cost. It also demonstrates how 
psychological understandings of creativity—while ultimately not 
able to stand alone as normative justifications of nonobvious-
ness—can serve as valuable proxies for economic nonobviousness 
by helping identify those inventions that bridge large cognitive 
distances. This reconceptualization of psychological views of non-
obviousness as proxies for economic nonobviousness for some 
types of inventions also brings clarity to judicial decisions, which 
often blend economic and psychological justifications without 
providing an explicit rationale for doing so. 
Second, building upon this theoretical understanding of non-
obviousness, we empirically developed a “network nonobvious-
ness score” (NNOS) that relies on the distance between the tech-
nical areas recombined in each individual invention. Because it is 
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grounded in empirical innovation data, the NNOS can be calcu-
lated for any date, and is thus able to account for the constant 
state of change in the innovation ecosystem. When applied to lit-
igated nonobviousness cases, our measure identified several cases 
that have been incorrectly decided under a network theory of pa-
tentability, while also providing empirical support for many of the 
Federal Circuit’s other nonobviousness decisions.290 We proposed 
a novel doctrinal framework that relies on the NNOS as an initial 
sorting mechanism both to distinguish global from local inven-
tions and to guide further analysis based on the different innova-
tion dynamics underlying these two innovation types. 
Finally, our algorithmic approach contributes to broader de-
bates in the legal literature about the rise of computational law. 
Despite the potential of an empirically informed nonobviousness 
measure to aid patentability decision-making, policymakers must 
consider the implications of how algorithmic design, and the data 
used to validate any measure of patentability, may affect the re-
sults. Recent years have brought increased adoption of computa-
tionally assisted decision-making technologies, which in turn has 
given rise to concerns about the biased results that these seem-
ingly objective technologies can lead to.291 These biases can have 
various causes, but the two most important in our context are 
(1) the result of biased data or (2) biased measure-design.292  
Biases resulting from data inputs can arise because many algo-
rithmically enabled decision-making or decision-support tools 
rely on existing data to classify new cases as they arise. This can 
lead to entrenchment of existing biases inherent in the existing 
data, as it becomes applied to new cases. In the context of our 
proposed NNOS, biased data inputs could arise if the classifica-
tion data used to estimate nonobviousness is systematically bi-
ased. Indeed, as the product of human decision-making, it is quite 
possible that these classifications are biased and the data is al-
most certainly imperfect. This is one of the reasons we advocate 
for a multivariate approach—for example by including citation, 
semantic, and social network data in a NNOS—so as to triangu-
late the nonobviousness estimate and reduce measurement error. 
 
 290 See Part III.D. 
 291 See, for example, Solon Barocas and Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate  
Impact, 104 Cal L Rev 671, 677–93 (2016). For discussion of patent-specific issues relating 
to the prospect of increased use of computationally assisted decision-making tools, see Arti 
K. Rai, Machine Learning at the Patent Office: Lessons for Patents and Administrative 
Law, 104 Iowa L Rev 2617, 2636–40 (2019). 
 292 See Barocas and Selbst, 104 Cal L Rev at 677–84 (cited in note 291). 
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Another potential source of bias arises from measure design. 
Here, the concern is not that the computationally assisted  
decision-making tool is reifying existing biases in an input or 
training dataset, but rather that some element of the way the al-
gorithm is designed may itself internalize a particular perspec-
tive on the construct being measured and thereby propagate that 
particular perspective. We have illustrated how this could arise 
in the context of the NNOS when we considered alternative ways 
of operationalizing the concept of network nonobviousness. There 
is a large body of research providing theoretical support for the 
notion that the network distance between an invention’s 
knowledge inputs provides a signal correlated with the risk and 
cost of achieving that particular invention—and therefore with its 
economic nonobviousness. Nevertheless, there is no single correct 
method to measure network distance. For the purposes of this Ar-
ticle, we picked the most distant pair of technological categories 
in any given invention as that invention’s NNOS. This choice re-
sults in a measure that privileges inventions which combine two 
highly distant knowledge areas over those that may combine 
many moderately distant knowledge areas. This is what we called 
the “invention complexity” problem in our algorithmic design. A 
differently designed measure could lead to dramatically different 
nonobviousness results. For instance, defining a NNOS as the 
sum of the distance between all technology areas recombined 
would lead to a measure that indicates nonobviousness when an 
invention combines many technology areas, even if they are only 
moderately distant from one another, while potentially indicating 
obviousness when an invention recombines only two highly  
distant areas. 
That such a minor variation on how one operationalizes net-
work nonobviousness could lead to such divergent results accen-
tuates the importance of measurement tool design. It also empha-
sizes the importance of algorithmic transparency, as only those 
with intimate knowledge of specific algorithm design choices 
would be able to identify these potential design biases. Ulti-
mately, in the case of NNOS design, as in most cases, there will 
be no single perfect design. That said, lest the perfect become the 
enemy of the good, the potential of a computationally assisted  
decision-making tool should not preclude its adoption. Evidence 
suggests that the current patentability decision-making at the 
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PTO is highly costly and error prone.293 Any tools that could help 
examiners be more efficient and accurate in their decision-mak-
ing process should be considered. 
In the case of a NNOS metric as proposed in this Article, im-
plementing it effectively will require that we remain aware of its 
limitations and potential biases and be open to iteratively updat-
ing and improving the measure. To do so, it would be best to in-
volve multiple and diverse stakeholders in the measure design, 
implementation, and improvement processes. By taking into con-
sideration the views of patent owners, applicants, examiners, and 
the public, policymakers will be better able to construct a tool that 
is responsive to the interests of these varied stakeholders, and, by 
treading a middle road between their often-competing views on 
how patentability should be defined and measured, is more likely 
to be implementable. 
Implementing such a tool will represent a major step in pa-
tent policy. Not only will it signal the patent system’s willingness 
to integrate some of the findings resulting from decades of  
network-oriented research on innovation and creativity, but it 
will also mark a willingness to more effectively use the vast troves 
of patenting data that the patent system currently produces, and 
subsequently underutilizes in patentability assessments. 
 
 293 See generally Michael D. Frakes and Melissa F. Wasserman, Does the U.S. Patent 
& Trademark Office Grant Too Many Bad Patents?: Evidence from a Quasi-Experiment, 
67 Stan L Rev 613 (2015). 
